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1 
Iowa Physicians: 
Legitimacy, Institutions,  
and the Practice of Medicine 
Part Three 
Dealing with Poverty  
and Defending Autonomy, 1929–1950 
SUSAN C. LAWRENCE 
IN JANUARY 1933 Dr. Oliver J. Fay, a general surgeon in Des 
Moines who chaired the Iowa State Medical Society’s Board of 
Trustees, addressed the Polk County Medical Society with his 
thoughts on the Final Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medi-
cal Care. That controversial report, the product of five years of 
research by an amply funded interdisciplinary group, was 
highly critical of medical care in America. Too many Americans 
did not have access to physicians, the report asserted, and even 
when they did, too many could not afford what they needed. 
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The recommendations of the majority, made up of economists, 
lawyers, sociologists, public health experts, and physicians, 
were hardly radical by twenty-first-century standards. The 
committee contended that public health services needed to be 
expanded to ensure safe water and milk supplies, proper com-
munity sanitation, and adequate control of communicable dis-
eases. The majority members also maintained that medical ser-
vices should be provided by coordinated groups of physicians, 
nurses, dentists, pharmacists, and assistants, rather than by in-
dependent, solo practitioners, in order to increase efficiency and 
efficacy in the delivery of health care. The report urged, more-
over, that “the costs of medical care be placed on a group pay-
ment basis,” using pre-payment insurance premiums and tax 
revenues, rather than centered on private, fee-for-service cash 
transactions arranged individually between the physician and 
the patient. With the support of public health services, “we can 
have no quarrel,” Dr. Fay admitted. The other recommendations 
of the report he denounced. They spelled doom for American 
medicine, for every physician’s independence and individualism. 
Dr. Fay concluded his essay with a ringing call for the physi-
cian’s “right to carry on unshackled by bureaucratic control.”1
By the early 1930s, the very success of the professional and 
political changes that had taken place in the state since the 1850s 
had put great strains on physicians’ autonomy and individual-
ism. As discussed in part one (1850–1886) of this three-part 
study, in the first decades of statehood Iowans sought medical 
                                                 
1. Medical Care for the American People: The Final Report of the Committee on the 
Costs of Medical Care (Chicago, 1932); Oliver J. Fay, “A Discussion of the Final 
Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care,” Journal of the Iowa State 
Medical Society (hereafter cited as JISMS) 23 (1933), 117, 120, 125. The full com-
mittee, which varied over the five years of the project, had more than 50 mem-
bers. Several minority reports were included in the final publication, where 
various constituencies dissented from some of the recommendations. Dr. Fay’s 
criticisms echoed those of seven of the private practice physicians on the com-
mittee, who, together with two other members, produced a strongly worded 
minority report against group practice and any type of medical insurance. 
There were 15 private practice physicians on the committee, however, so 
seven of those doctors, along with eight other MDs in public health or institu-
tional positions, agreed with the majority report. Paul Starr, The Social Trans-
formation of American Medicine (New York, 1982), 261–66; Forrest A. Walker, 
“Americanism versus Sovietism: A Study of the Reaction to the Committee on 
the Costs of Medical Care,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 53 (1979), 489–504. 
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care from a diverse range of practitioners who competed with 
each other for patients free from the “bureaucratic control” of 
state licensing laws. Among the groups with differing therapeu-
tic philosophies, only the regular, eclectic, and homeopathic 
doctors had active leaders who launched medical schools, cre-
ated medical societies, lobbied for public health measures, and 
supported, for the most part, the building of state-funded insti-
tutions for the insane and other medical unfortunates. It took 
until 1886 for doctors to put aside their disputes long enough to 
push a medical practice act through the state legislature, giving 
bureaucratic control of medical licensing to a state board of med-
ical examiners.2 In those decades, at least some Iowa physicians 
learned the power of collective action and political maneuver-
ing in their efforts to establish legitimacy. Most practitioners, 
nevertheless, had probably just gone about their business: see-
ing patients, dealing with illnesses and traumas, and trying to 
make a decent living.  
Between 1887 and 1928, the promises of scientific and techno-
logical innovations significantly changed the practice of medi-
cine. Part two (1887–1928) covered the way Iowa’s licensing law 
gave the State Board of Medical Examiners the power to reshape 
medical education, leaving the state with only one regular med-
ical school, at the University of Iowa, in 1913. Bacteriology be-
came the poster child for the value of laboratory science to 
understand and, in some cases, to actually prevent and treat 
life-threatening infectious diseases. The discovery and spread of 
x-ray imaging in medicine similarly epitomized the technologi-
cal wonders of medicine made modern. The number of hospi-
tals across the state grew dramatically, from 21 in 1890 to 175 in 
1930, as the preferred places for surgical operations shifted from 
homes to operating theaters. Physicians became increasingly 
dependent on access to laboratory tests, x-ray machines, and 
hospital facilities when caring for their patients, and increas-
ingly felt pressured to keep up with the deluge of information 
coming out of research laboratories and from the pens of prom-
inent practitioners. The staunchly individualistic country doctor 
                                                 
2. Susan C. Lawrence, “Iowa Physicians: Legitimacy, Institutions, and the Prac-
tice of Medicine,” Part 1, “Establishing a Professional Identity,” Annals of Iowa 
62 (2003), 151–200. 
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who relied only on his own experience with time-tested reme-
dies was no longer a quaint eccentric, no matter how beloved; 
he started to be dangerously old-fashioned. Members of the 
Iowa State Medical Society (ISMS) worked hard to encourage 
all Iowa physicians to attend meetings of their county medical 
societies, sign up for postgraduate courses, read medical jour-
nals, and adapt to the collective wisdom of experts and spe-
cialists—a push that continued from 1928 to 1950. On the politi-
cal side, state legislators in Iowa generally supported the growth 
of hospitals and the development of public health efforts in 
those decades, but they by no means slavishly followed main-
stream medicine’s wish list. Licensing acts for osteopathic phy-
sicians (1902) and chiropractic healers (1921), for instance, upset 
ISMS members, who discovered that their claims to scientific 
authority in medical matters did not persuade Iowans to re-
nounce alternative practices.3  
This article, the last of this three-part series, briefly lays out 
some of the major changes in medical organization and institu-
tions in Iowa between 1929 and 1950. The bulk of the essay then 
focuses on the effects that the rising costs of medical care had on 
ordinary Iowa physicians. Anxiety about the expense of medi-
cal services for the respectable working and middle classes 
joined worries about paying for the basic health needs of the 
indigent and marginally poor. In the 1910s and 1920s, more 
physicians and more patients expected hospital stays for sur-
gery and childbirth, looked to laboratory-based tests for diag-
nostic information, and required office visits for vaccinations, 
health checkups, and ongoing monitoring of treatments, and all 
of these cost money. These changing standards of medical care 
had already started to reshape the meaning of access to ade-
quate medical practice, especially in rural areas and among 
lower income groups, by the late 1920s.4 The disjunction be-
tween what scientifically trained physicians could provide and 
what people perceived they could afford, along with the widen-
                                                 
3. Susan C. Lawrence, “Iowa Physicians: Legitimacy, Institutions, and the Prac-
tice of Medicine,” Part 2, “Putting Science into Practice,” Annals of Iowa 62 
(2004), 1–62. 
4. Clive A. Henry, “Green Fields of the Country Practitioner,” JISMS 19 (1929), 
95–102. 
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ing gap between professional knowledge and common lay un-
derstanding of health and disease, led to a widespread crisis of 
confidence in the traditional fee-for-service, individualistic sys-
tem of private medical practice. The worsening of the Iowa 
economy in the late 1920s and the national depression through-
out the 1930s turned the problem of medical care for the poor 
and for those on the margins of solvency into a major issue for 
Iowa doctors.  
Until the early 1930s, dealing with the poor in America was 
almost entirely a local responsibility: local governments (coun-
ties, towns, and cities) and charities (lay and religious) provided 
the food, clothing, shelter, medicines, and therapies that kept 
most of those in dire straits from dying in the streets. With the 
onset of the Great Depression, the local, customary, and ad hoc 
ways of dealing with medical neediness stopped working. Infu-
sions of federal and state funds into local governments after 
1934 brought much needed help, yet also brought state-level 
expectations for the oversight and accountability of money 
spent on health care. Iowa’s economy recovered during World 
War II, as did the nation’s, but debates about health care costs 
and services became even more heated. In the years immedi-
ately following the war, many Americans hoped that private, 
employer-based health insurance would expand to fill citizens’ 
needs for protection against the costs of catastrophic, poverty-
inducing illnesses and traumas. In Iowa, as in other states, phy-
sicians who objected to commercial insurance companies taking 
on health care coverage reluctantly agreed to form a non-profit, 
physician-controlled plan organized at the state level. The Iowa 
State Medical Society essentially created the Iowa Medical Ser-
vice (Blue Shield) in 1945–46. Iowa physicians pushed the Iowa 
Medical Service plan as a viable, and better, alternative to a fed-
erally funded, universal-coverage national health insurance 
program when arguing against various bills that went to Con-
gress in the late 1940s. Responsibility for medical care for the 
poor largely returned to county governments, with some state 
oversight and state-funded programs, until the 1960s. 
Quite a few historians have written on twentieth-century 
American health care politics and policies from a national, and 
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predominately urban, viewpoint.5 Their work certainly informs 
this study of the history of medicine in Iowa. I argue, however, 
that examining health care politics at the state and county level, 
particularly in a rural, agricultural state such as Iowa, offers a 
vital perspective on the dynamics of national politics, because 
so many of the day-to-day experiences that physicians had with 
“government” medicine first took place at the county level.6 
Physicians had to deal with those in need in their own commu-
nities at the same time that they competed with each other for 
paying patients. Appreciating how physicians throughout Iowa 
discussed medical politics and reacted to payment plans run by 
non-physicians helps us to understand how and why organized 
medicine—seen so clearly at the national level of the American 
Medical Association (AMA)—became such a powerful economic 
and political force in American society in the 1930s and 1940s.  
Concentrating on “organized medicine”—medicine seen 
through institutional data, meeting reports, and items printed 
in the Journal of the Iowa State Medical Society—obviously misses 
a great deal.7 Much more work is needed on the ways people 
experienced health needs in Iowa, interacted with physicians, 
used hospitals, and expected—or not—that new scientific and 
                                                 
5. Among the most important works on the complexities of medical politics 
and economics in American history are Starr, Social Transformation; Colin Gor-
don, Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America 
(Princeton, NJ, 2003); Beatrix Hoffman, The Wages of Sickness: The Politics of 
Health Insurance in Progressive America (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001); and Ronald 
Numbers, Almost Persuaded: American Physicians and Compulsory Health Insur-
ance, 1912–1920 (Baltimore, 1978). 
6. Michael R. Grey makes the same argument in his excellent study, New Deal 
Medicine: The Rural Health Programs of the Farm Security Administration (Balti-
more, 1999). Grey focuses particularly on states with large FSA programs, es-
pecially North Dakota and South Dakota. 
7. In addition to the lacunae mentioned in the text, note that several social 
movements that involved physicians and medical care in Iowa have been 
omitted from this discussion. Among these, one of the most important is the 
eugenics movement in Iowa. See Amy Vogel, “Regulating Degeneracy: Eu-
genic Sterilization in Iowa, 1911–1977,” Annals of Iowa 54 (1995), 121–43. For 
discussions of eugenics in the JISMS, see “Legalized Eugenic Sterilization,” 
JISMS 25 (1935), 155; “Report of Special Committee on Eugenics,” JISMS 11 
(1921), 278; “Sterilization of the Unfit,” JISMS 19 (1929), 127–28; Eleanor 
Hutchinson, “Possibilities for Race Betterment,” JISMS 24 (1934), 577–80; Wil-
lard C. Brinegar et al., “Sterilization of Patients Discharged from Four Iowa 
State Hospitals in 1947,” JISMS 40 (1950), 263–64. 
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medical discoveries would make a difference in their lives and 
deaths. National studies on “average” health care costs in the 
1930s and 1940s may provide interesting figures, but such data 
are useless for understanding the choices that rural and urban 
Iowans made about health care. Alternative, unlicensed healers 
did not disappear just because Iowa had medical practice acts. 
Drugstores carried scores of over-the-counter remedies that of-
fered relief without the bother of seeing a doctor, and Iowa saw 
its share of entrepreneurs promising dubious cures.8 The sources 
used for this article amply document Iowa physicians’ com-
plaints about these treatment options, but doctors’ grumblings 
give poor estimates of the extent and seriousness of Iowans’ 
engagement with self-help and irregular practitioners in these 
decades. Similarly, passing notices and references suggest that 
public health campaigns to spread information about contagious 
diseases, to inform people about the importance of early detec-
tion of cancer, and to get schoolchildren in for health checkups 
all depended on armies of volunteers and community organiza-
tions; their local efforts deserve further analysis.9 Articles in the 
                                                 
8. Eric S. Juhnke, Quacks and Crusaders: The Fabulous Careers of John Brinkley, 
Norman Baker and Harry Hoxsey (Lawrence, KS, 2002), 36–63, details Norman 
Baker’s claims to cure cancer at his hospital in Muscatine in the early 1930s; 
James C. Whorton, Nature Cures: The History of Alternative Medicine in America 
(New York, 2002), provides a useful overview of alternative healing move-
ments. For the popularity of over-the-counter dietary supplements following 
the discoveries of vitamins, see Rima D. Apple, Vitamania: Vitamins in Ameri-
can Culture (New Brunswick, NJ, 1996). 
9. Laura Gellott, “Visiting the Rural Community: A Public Health Education 
Program in the 1930s,” Mid-America: A Historical Review 69 (1987), 21–38; Mrs. 
Fred Moore, “The Women’s Auxiliary to the Iowa State Medical Society,” in 
One Hundred Years of Iowa Medicine: Commemorating the Centenary of the Iowa 
State Medical Society, 1850–1950 (Iowa City, 1950), 427–29. The women’s auxil-
iary had a regular news page in the JISMS after 1936. Most historical work on 
women’s clubs to date focuses on the years before 1930 and deals largely with 
education, libraries, or political activism rather than local health concerns. See, 
for example, Anne Firor Scott, Natural Allies: Women’s Associations in American 
History (Urbana, 1991). Gerald Gamm and Robert D. Putnam, “The Growth of 
Voluntary Associations in America, 1840–1940,” Journal of Interdisciplinary His-
tory 29 (1999), 511–57, point out that voluntary associations after 1910 were 
particularly strong in “the hinterland” (514) rather than in large, urban areas, 
where voluntarism actually declined. A few national-level histories of volun-
tary health organizations have been written, and they could provide useful 
starting points for further research on local efforts. See, for example, Walter S. 
Ross, Crusade: The Official History of the American Cancer Society (New York, 1987). 
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ISMS Journal show, moreover, that new research results, drugs, 
and procedures entered medical practice in the state, but it is 
impossible to know from these texts how many Iowa physicians 
actually studied these innovations and incorporated them suc-
cessfully into their own work.10
Focusing on the professional preoccupations of members of 
the Iowa State Medical Society also requires acknowledging 
that the vast majority of them were white and male. The editors 
of the ISMS Journal occasionally noted when an African Ameri-
can doctor settled in Iowa, and in 1933 its “Interesting News” 
column noted that only eight African American physicians 
practiced in a state with 17,380 African Americans.11 The health 
needs of African Americans, Native Americans, and other mi-
norities generated no major articles or editorials, confirming the 
sense that those populations largely stayed below mainstream 
medicine’s sightlines during the Depression and war years. 
Women’s names appear as authors of articles in the ISMS Jour-
nal, but women never seem to turn up serving as county dele-
gates to the business meetings of the society or participating in 
delegate discussions. Members were sometimes identified only 
by initials, so a few women may have played such roles, but 
certainly no woman was elected as an executive officer during 
these decades. Until 1942, some women physicians did gather 
each year for a day-long meeting of the “State Society of Iowa 
                                                 
10. For examples of reports of new drugs and therapies, see Elmer Kottke, “Non-
specific Immunotransfusions in the Treatment of Hemolytic Streptococcus 
Septicemia,” JISMS 24 (1934), 431–36 (on serum therapy); Frank G. Norbury, 
“The Use of Barbital Products,” JISMS 26 (1936), 338–43 (on barbituates, such 
as phenobarbital, sodium amytal, and nembutal); Arthur C. Christie, “Present 
Conception of Radiation in the Treatment of Cancer,” JISMS 27 (1937), 1–9; R. B. 
Gibson, “Fluids for Intravenous and Subcutaneous Use,” JISMS 29 (1939), 19–
20; Elmer L. DeGowin, “Blood Transfusion Reactions,” JISMS 29 (1939), 20–21; 
Ralph L. Gorrell, “The Uses of Benzedrine Sulfate in General Practice,” JISMS 
29 (1939), 451–53 (on amphetamines); James Green, “The Clinical Use of Adrenal 
Cortical Hormone,” JISMS 30 (1940), 287–91; Capt. Harold Schwartz, “Analy-
sis of the Rh Factor,” JISMS 33 (1943), 217–19; and Diedrich J. Haines, “The 
Anticoagulant Drugs,” JISMS 37 (1947), 446–49 (on coumadin and heparin).  
11. “Personal Mention,” JISMS 23 (1933), 173; “Interesting News,” JISMS 23 
(1933), 688. For an important survey of African American physicians in Iowa, 
see Steven Berry and Erin Herndon, “Healing Hands, Questing Hearts: Afri-
can-American Physicians in Iowa,” in Bill Silag et al., eds., Outside In: African-
American History in Iowa, 1838–2000 (Des Moines, 2001), 243–69.  
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Medical Women,” which held sessions on the day before the 
start of the ISMS regular annual conference. Between 1942 and 
1950, however, the women had “no scientific programs” at their 
gatherings over lunch or dinner.12 The absence of African Amer-
ican and women physicians in this article thus directly reflects 
their relative absence from professional power in the 1930s and 
1940s, but not their absence from the practice of medicine. 
 
Access to Care: Physicians, Hospitals, and Public Health 
By 1928, the movement of physicians from rural areas to towns 
and cities was well under way. Telephones, automobiles, paved 
roads, hospitals, and the amenities of town life all played a part 
in this internal migration. Various experts debated the relation-
ships among the number of doctors, their geographic distribution, 
and the adequacies of medical care for Americans, but Iowans 
certainly noticed that young physicians were not replacing 
small-town practitioners who moved or retired in the 1930s and 
1940s.13 The 1940 federal census revealed, for example, that 67 
percent of Iowa’s physicians lived in urban areas, while only 
43 percent of the state’s population did.14 Less remarked upon 
in the state medical journal, but certainly noticeable in public 
data, were overall declines in the numbers of both physicians 
and hospitals between 1931 and 1950. There were 3,125 physi-
cians practicing in Iowa in 1931 but only 2,890 in 1950. As the 
state’s population increased in those decades, the ratio of physi-
cian to residents dropped from one per 790 in 1930 to one per 
907 in 1950 (see table 1). There was a perceptible drop in the 
number of general practitioners, as well, from 2,718 (87 percent) 
to 2,201 (76 percent), as more doctors chose to limit their work 
to a specialty. Similarly, the number of Iowa’s 99 counties that 
had a hospital fell from 75 in 1931 to 68 in 1950; the total num- 
                                                 
12. Jeannette Dean Throckmorton, “State Society of Iowa Medical Women,” in 
One Hundred Years of Medicine in Iowa, 425–26. 
13. “The Rural Physician,” JISMS 26 (1936), 106; “Rural Medical Supply,” 
JISMS 37 (1947), 213–14. 
14. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Bulletin. Population. Third Series. The Labor Force 
(Washington, DC, 1942), Table 10. In 1940 the Bureau of the Census defined 
“urban” as towns of more than 2,500 people. 
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TABLE 1 
SPECIALTY PRACTICE IN IOWA, 1931 AND 1950 
 1931 1950 
Total number of physicians in Iowa 3,125 2,890 
Number limiting practice to a specialty 407 (13%) 689 (24%) 
Specialists with national board certification 31* 279** 
General practitioners 2,718 (87%) 2,201 (76%) 
SOURCE: The American Medical Directory, 1931 and 1950. 
*In 1931 only three specialties had national boards: Ophthalmology (1917), Otolaryngol-
ogy (1924), and Obstetrics and Gynecology (1930). 
**In 1950, sixteen specialties had national boards: Ophthalmology (1917); Otolaryngology 
(1924); Obstetrics and Gynecology (1930); Dermatology (1932); Pediatrics (1933); Ortho-
pedic Surgery (1934); Psychiatry and Neurology (1934); Radiology (1934); Urology (1935); 
Internal Medicine (1936); Pathology (1936); Anesthesiology (1937); Plastic Surgery (1937); 
Surgery (1937); Neurological Surgery (1940); Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (1947). 
 
ber of institutions fell from 175 to 133 across the state (see table 
2). These were hardly dramatic changes, but they nevertheless 
suggest that some Iowans had reasons to believe that access to 
basic medical care had gotten worse, not better, in those years.15
 A few bare numbers tell only part of the story, of course, 
and can have multiple interpretations. From the perspective of 
the profession’s leaders, the decline in the number of doctors 
was a necessary corrective to the oversupply of poorly trained 
physicians pumped out of proprietary medical schools in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The drop in the 
number of hospitals in Iowa occurred because quite a few very 
small, privately owned hospitals closed in these decades. Some 
hospitals merged with others, especially in larger towns and 
cities, and yet other institutions added buildings and wings, so 
that there were actually more hospital beds in Iowa in 1950 than 
in 1931, even if they were farther away from small rural com-
munities.16 Professional leaders thus also saw the end of small 
hospitals that, in some cases, were no more than boardinghouses 
with nursing care and a physician close by, as a sign of progress. 
                                                 
15. T. A. Moran, “Are Prospective Medical Students Getting a Square Deal?” 
JISMS 27 (1937), 500–501. 
16. Iowa followed national trends in hospital closings and distribution. See 
Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and In Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth 
Century (New York, 1989), 121–22, 147–49. 
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TABLE 2 
HOSPITALS IN IOWA, 1931 AND 1950 
Primary funding and affiliation 1931 1950 
Religious and charitable: Total 65 72 
 Catholic 29 32 
 Protestant 15 14 
 Charity/Non-profit Associations 19 26 
 Fraternal 2  
   
Private individual or partnership businesses: Total 75 30 
 Private – physician owned 54 22 
 Private – other groups and unknown 20 7 
 Railroad consortium 1 1 
   
Tax-based institutions: Total 35 31 
 Federal – Military and Veterans 2 2 
 State – Mental disorders 6 7 
 State – General 2 2 
 State – Tuberculosis 2 1 
 County – Mental disorders 3  
 County – General 5 4 
 County – Tuberculosis 4 3 
 County – Isolation  1 
 Municipal – General 8 11 
 Municipal – Isolation 3  
Total 175 133 
SOURCES: Clyde A. Boice, “Hospitals in Iowa,” in One Hundred Years of Medicine in Iowa, 
371-419; American Medical Directory, vol. 12 (1931); “Hospitals Registered by the Ameri-
can Medical Association,” JAMA 146 (1951), 139–40. The 1950 data include the Atchison, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Employees Hospital in Fort Madison, as physicians listed 
it as their place of work in the American Medical Directory, 1950. 
 
The American College of Surgeons (ACS), a national group 
heavily invested in improving the quality of hospital facilities for 
surgical work in these decades, had started reviewing and certi-
fying hospitals that met their minimum standards for staffing, 
equipment, and services in 1918.17 Only 34 Iowa hospitals met 
their standards in 1931. The number went up to 46 by 1950, but 
that was still only 35 percent of the state’s institutions.  
                                                 
17. Stevens, In Sickness and In Wealth, 68–70, 116–20. Samuel Levey et al., The 
Rise of a University Teaching Hospital: A Leadership Perspective, The University 
of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (Chicago, 1996), 94–97, covers the introduction of 
ACS standards and the UI hospital’s compliance; for residencies, see 181–83.  
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The shift toward fewer but better physicians and fewer but 
better hospitals played out well for the residents of Iowa’s larger 
cities. The resulting geographical inequities, along with continu-
ing debates over what access to health care really meant, never-
theless heightened the perception that rural populations were 
increasingly underserved. In the postwar years, Iowa legislators 
generally supported the push for federal funding to build hos-
pitals and health centers for rural areas.18 Finding solutions for 
the unequal distribution of physicians, especially with the de-
cline in the number of general practitioners, was far more con-
tentious, and it has remained an ongoing political and economic 
issue.19
 To the concern about the number and distribution of physi-
cians, adequate hospitals, and rural versus urban practice must 
be added frictions between academic medicine—the medicine 
of research institutes, university medical schools, large teaching 
hospitals, and prestigious specialty boards—and the medicine 
of full-time community practitioners. Gown-and-town tensions 
were certainly not new to medicine in Iowa, but some became 
particularly sharp during the Depression and war, and played a 
role in medical politics throughout the state.  
After 1913, the University of Iowa (UI) College of Medicine 
was the only regular medical school in Iowa, and Iowa’s physi-
cians were repeatedly urged to support and admire “their” col-
lege of medicine and the university’s hospitals. That was not 
always easy when it seemed that the UI’s need for resources 
conflicted with small-town practitioners’ needs for payments 
and patients. The Perkins Act (1915) and the Haskell-Klaus Act 
(1919) funded a steady stream of indigent children and adults to 
the UI hospitals, where their numbers allowed for major expan-
                                                 
18. “Rural Health Program in Iowa,” JISMS 36 (1946), 527–28; “Hospital Con-
struction in Iowa,” JISMS 36 (1946), 494–95; “Hospital Survey and Construc-
tion Program,” JISMS 39 (1949), 22–23. On the shortage of nurses and techni-
cians for new hospitals, see “What Will the Hospital Building Program En-
tail?” JISMS 40 (1950), 187. 
19. Lee Anderson, Internal Medicine and the Structures of Modern Medical Science: 
The University of Iowa, 1870–1990 (Ames, 1996), 134–38; “National Conference 
on Medical Service,” JISMS 37 (1947), 134; Arthur D. Woods, “General Practice 
and Licensure,” JISMS 40 (1950), 199–204. 
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sion into the new Children’s Hospital (1919) and General Hos-
pital (1928). Those patients provided the population base for 
teaching cases, without which the medical school could not sur-
vive. Care of the indigent—and the distribution of the tax funds 
that supported that care—was a major source of envy and hard 
feelings in the 1930s and 1940s. On the other hand, the state’s aca-
demic medical center administrators and faculty felt considerable 
frustration over budget cuts, calls to end or modify indigent care 
funding to the UI, and complaints from Iowa physicians that UI 
doctors competed unfairly with non-UI practitioners for private 
(paying) patients.20  
Much of the sense of unfair competition came from the ob-
vious associations between the UI’s medical school, its tax-
supported teaching hospital, and the rise of specialty practice. 
Across the United States, specialization throve in medical 
schools and teaching hospitals, and the UI was no exception. In 
1928 the UI had 13 clinical departments, each with specialists as 
faculty. Together with faculty in the basic science departments, 
specialists parceled out lecture, laboratory, and clinical time in 
the four-year medical curriculum to piece together the educa-
tion of the all-purpose doctor who, after one year of hospital 
experience as an intern, could jump into general practice.21 
Many medical students did enter general practice, but the allure 
of specialization intensified in the 1930s and 1940s. Specialists 
topped the hierarchy in science-based medical knowledge, 
clinical expertise, and professional prestige, as students could 
not help but notice as they made hospital rounds. They also 
made a great deal more money than general practitioners. In 
1931, for example, readers of the ISMS Journal learned that spe-
cialists in the United States averaged an income of $16,000 per 
                                                 
20. W. W. Bowen, “The Present Status of Medicine,” JISMS 24 (1934), 146. Lee 
Anderson’s Internal Medicine provides a nuanced account of this troubled pe-
riod from the UI College of Medicine’s perspective; see especially 59–64, 80, 
103–7. The UI hospitals’ standpoint is equally well explained in Levey et al., 
University Teaching Hospital, especially 147–58, 188–95.  
21. E. M. MacEwen, “Medicine and Medical Education in the Postwar Era,” 
JISMS 35 (1945), 356–57; Kenneth M. Ludmerer, Time to Heal: American Medical 
Education from the Turn of the Century to the Era of Managed Care (New York, 
1999), 66–70. 
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year, compared with an average of $2,000 to $5,000 for “well 
established [general] physicians in small communities.”22  
General practitioners could develop specialty interests by 
joining specialist medical societies, taking short courses in spe-
cialty areas, and announcing their shifts in practice to their col-
leagues and patients until they could restrict their work entirely 
to one field. As early as the late 1910s, however, national socie-
ties and organizations of specialists became increasingly con-
cerned that any licensed physician could claim to be a specialist 
and limit his or her practice to a particular area of medicine, 
such as ophthalmology, obstetrics, or neurosurgery, without 
having to demonstrate appropriate knowledge and skills to her 
or his practicing peers. Instead of turning to state legislators for 
legal restrictions on what a self-proclaimed specialist could or 
could not do without an additional layer of licensing, specialists 
pushed for public recognition of voluntary certification of com-
petence by professional boards, who represented national, not 
state or local, interests. From the American Board of Ophthal-
mology (1917) to the American Board of Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation (1947), representatives from a wide range of spe-
cialty societies met to establish the ground rules for their par-
ticular areas of expertise. As these national boards launched 
themselves, they all began with ways for existing practitioners 
to qualify for board certification through reputations achieved 
by publications, faculty positions, specialist society member-
ships, and the documentation of patients actually treated. For 
younger practitioners, and for future ones, each board set up 
expectations for years of clinical experience in the specialty and 
required applicants to pass national examinations of knowledge 
and skills. As the best way to gain appropriate clinical experi-
ence efficiently was through periods of hospital training beyond 
the internship year, specialty residency positions in hospitals 
became the standard route to specialty practice and, if desired, 
board certification.23
Of course, not just any hospital would do for residency edu-
cation. In 1920 the AMA’s Council on Medical Education and 
                                                 
22. “Interesting News,” JISMS 21 (1931), 95.  
23. Ludmerer, Time to Heal, 80–101; Starr, Social Transformation, 223–25, 356–57. 
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Hospitals started to identify hospitals that had the facilities and 
staff necessary to offer internship training, and the council ex-
tended its purview to approve hospitals for residency positions 
in 1924. The number of hospitals in Iowa that could offer the in-
ternship experience required for medical licensing stood at ten 
in 1931, 1940, and 1950, all—except for the hospitals in Iowa 
City—in cities with more than 40,000 residents: Cedar Rapids, 
Council Bluffs, Davenport, Des Moines, and Sioux City. Even 
more was expected for hospitals to qualify for residency posi-
tions, because such training created the profession’s elite. In 
Iowa in 1931 only two hospitals had residencies: UI’s general 
hospital and the UI Psychopathic Hospital, which provided 
specialty training in psychiatry. To these, by 1940, were added 
Oakdale Sanatorium for specialists in lung diseases and St. 
Luke’s Methodist Hospital in Cedar Rapids. By 1950, the total 
number had increased to ten hospitals, including several general 
hospitals in Des Moines and, for psychiatric specialization, the 
Cherokee State Hospital for Mental Diseases in Cherokee.24 Five 
hospitals had both internship and residency approval in 1950.  
The distribution of hospitals approved for internships and 
residencies reflected the distribution of Iowa physicians who 
not only claimed specialty practice, but also achieved board cer-
tification. For the state as a whole, 279 (40 percent) of the 689 
specialists had passed national board requirements by 1950 (see 
table 1). At the UI Hospital, 90 percent of the 61 faculty who 
were specialists in areas with national boards had qualified for 
them. In Des Moines, the largest urban area in Iowa (and ten 
times the size of Iowa City), 51 percent of the 118 who limited 
their practices to a specialty with a national board had a board 
certification. In contrast, of the five small cities in Iowa with 
populations between 10,000 and 15,000, only 18 of the 91 physi-
cians (20 percent) restricted their work to a board-recognized 
specialty, and just five of them (28 percent) had sought board 
certification by 1950.25  
                                                 
24. Entries for hospitals in Iowa in the American Medical Directory, 1930 and 
1939; “Hospitals Registered by the American Medical Association,” Journal of 
the American Medical Association (hereafter cited as JAMA) 146 (1951), 139–40. 
25. American Medical Directory, 1950. The five small cities were Ames, Boone, 
Fort Madison, Newton, and Oskaloosa. Only the last three had general hospi-
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The UI Hospital clearly did not have a monopoly on special-
ists, even board-certified specialists, but it did have the high 
ground when it came to expecting that clinicians would obtain 
the official approbation of national peers when claiming exper-
tise in specialty areas. The fear that UI specialists would—and 
did—draw well-to-do private patients from across the state, 
away from perfectly fine practitioners in other cities and towns, 
led to an understanding reached in 1928 that no more than 5 
percent of the beds in the UI hospitals could be used for paying 
patients. This minimum was regularly overlooked, however, 
which fueled Iowa physicians’ anxieties in these decades, espe-
cially when a few outspoken UI clinicians roundly criticized 
any restriction on their private practices. Whether the UI faculty 
could realistically have threatened many physicians’ livelihoods 
matters less than the way that the UI stood for all of the changes 
affecting medicine: larger and larger hospitals with fancy diag-
nostic laboratories, the newest in expensive, advanced devices 
(such as the first respirator and electrocardiograph), increasing 
expertise in highly technical research science, and the fragmen-
tation of the patient into dehumanized parts.26
Private practice physicians across the state also dealt with 
the mixed blessings of state-funded public health programs, 
regulations, and initiatives in the decades from 1928 to 1950. 
On the one hand, public health work to improve sanitation, 
gather vital statistics, monitor outbreaks of infectious diseases, 
promote vaccinations, and educate Iowans about personal hy-
giene all had visible results, despite the privations of the De-
pression and war. Maternal and infant mortality declined 
substantially during these years (see fig. 1). By 1946–47, Iowa  
                                                                                                       
tals, although there was an infirmary at Iowa State University for students that 
may have been available in emergencies to other Ames residents. Medical 
sociologists have studied the distribution of physicians in considerable depth, 
using sophisticated statistical methods. See, for example, David L. Brown, 
“The Redistribution of Physicians and Dentists in Incorporated Places of the 
Upper Midwest, 1950–1970,” Rural Sociology 39 (1974), 205–23. 
26. Anderson, Internal Medicine, 104–6; Levey et al., University Teaching Hospi-
tal, 188, 192–95, 234–39; “Report of Committee on Medical Education and 
Hospitals,” JISMS 40 (1950), 342–44; “The Family Doctor and the Specialist,” 
JISMS 21 (1931), 189; “A New Therapeutic Problem,” JISMS 29 (1939), 462; 
“The Role of the General Practitioner,” 37 JISMS (1947), 171–72. 
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 FIGURE 1 
DEATH RATES IN IOWA, 1925–1950: 
TOTAL DEATHS, INFANT DEATHS, AND MATERNAL DEATHS 
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SOURCE: Division of Records and Statistics, Iowa State Department 
of Health, Vital Statistics of Iowa (Des Moines, 1977), Table 3. 
 
boasted the lowest death rate from tuberculosis in the nation: 
11.8 per 100,000 people, compared with the national rate of 33.5 
per 100,000.27 These successes came primarily from traditional 
public health techniques that focused on identifying individuals 
with diseases, urging those who needed professional care to 
seek it, and imposing quarantines or isolation on actively con-
tagious citizens.28 Antibiotics, notably streptomycin (developed 
in 1944–1946), effective against tuberculosis, and penicillin (from 
laboratory work to mass production between 1938 and 1943), 
                                                 
27. “Iowa Leads in Tuberculosis Program,” JISMS 36 (1946), 298–99; “Tuber-
culosis Death Rate per 100,000 Population among Residents of Each State,” 
JISMS 39 (1949), 216. For a comparison with earlier data, see “Tuberculosis 
Morbidity and Mortality in Iowa,” JISMS 25 (1935), 617–18. 
28. For an overview of public health developments in the United States in 
these decades, see John Duffy, The Sanitarians: A History of American Public 
Health (Chicago, 1990), 256–72. For discussions of the demographic transition 
from deaths due to infectious diseases to deaths from chronic conditions such 
as heart disease and cancer, see the still classic Thomas McKeown, The Modern 
Rise of Population (New York, 1976); and James C. Riley, Rising Life Expectancy: 
A Global History (Cambridge, 2001). 
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the wonder-drug for a range of infections that affected maternal 
and infant morbidity, did not have a significant impact until 
they reached mass distribution and physicians learned how and 
when to administer them.29
Iowans were a bit more reluctant to embrace vaccination 
against smallpox, however, which led Walter Bierring, the State 
Commissioner of Health from 1933 through 1953, to observe in 
1942 that Iowa had an “undesirable reputation of being one of 
the hotbeds of smallpox infestation in the nation.”30 Physicians 
were required to immediately report cases of major infectious 
Diseases to the State Department of Health so that nascent epi-
demics could be contained, and Dr. Bierring issued monthly 
reports and warnings, published in the ISMS Journal, listing 
numbers of cases and, except for syphilis and gonorrhea, the 
counties where cases appeared.31 Both physicians and public 
health workers knew well, however, that doctors were not al-
ways called even for serious diseases, such as smallpox, measles, 
and diphtheria, which allowed them to spread and, of course, 
skewed the numbers that Dr. Bierring’s department so carefully 
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west, requires more research. Existing historical accounts suggest that the anti-
vaccination movement had more or less disintegrated by the 1930s, but this 
seems to underplay continuing localized fears of the procedure. See Martin 
Kaufman, “The American Anti-Vaccinationists and their Arguments,” Bulletin 
of the History of Medicine 41 (1967), 463–78. 
31. For mandatory reporting laws, state authority to require quarantines, plac-
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those seen as a danger to public health, see 1931 Code of Iowa, ch. 108. For an 
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McGee, “State Administration of Public Health in Iowa,” Iowa Journal of History 
and Politics 31 (1933), 163–210. 
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tabulated each month.32 Public health surveillance and notifica-
tions also alerted Iowa’s physicians to diseases that had been 
under-appreciated or even barely recognized as health threats 
at the start of the twentieth century, such as poliomyelitis and 
undulant fever (later renamed brucellosis).33 Even before com-
bat in the Pacific brought U.S. soldiers back home to Iowa with 
worrisome—and infectious—tropical diseases, moreover, Dr. 
Bierring alerted the state’s doctors to a rise in reported cases of 
malaria, a debilitating and sometimes fatal disease carried by 
anopheline mosquitoes.34 The persistence of smallpox, out-
breaks of polio, and a potential postwar resurgence in malaria 
reminded Iowans not to become complacent just because ty-
phoid, diphtheria and tuberculosis seemed to be on the wane.  
On the other hand, physicians remained concerned that pub-
lic health initiatives, especially when championed by lay groups, 
would trespass upon the individual, fee-for-service practice of 
medicine. Dr. R. G. Leland of Chicago assured members of the 
ISMS in 1934 that “you do not here have the same fears, the same 
encroachments of health department activities on the practice 
of medicine, that exists in some other states,” and he praised 
Dr. Bierring’s intent to keep proper boundaries around public 
health measures. Major efforts to improve children’s health by 
organizing annual “round-ups” of schoolchildren for medical 
checkups, for example, required careful negotiations among the 
staff of the Bureau of Maternity and Child Hygiene (part of the 
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State Department of Health), representatives from parent and 
teacher associations, and members of county medical societies to 
ensure that any information distributed was physician-approved 
and that doctors who participated were appropriately compen-
sated. Physicians involved in running private laboratories in 
1934 protested strongly when the State Department of Health 
planned to maintain its “free” (tax-funded) clinical laboratory 
services for testing blood, spinal fluid, and tissues for infectious 
diseases, agreeing only that the state hygienic laboratory should 
provide free tests for indigent patients. Otherwise, they main-
tained, individuals should be charged the same fees expected 
from private laboratories. In 1950 the ISMS Board of Trustees 
voiced its concern that the State Department of Health had 
agreed to give the Iowa Heart Association “$10,000 and a truck 
with x-ray” for the “diagnosis and treatment of heart conditions.” 
Diagnostic screening of “indigent or semi-indigent persons” 
was in line with past initiatives, but “with the treatment part 
being left to the private practice of medicine.” The board called 
for the ISMS to again scrutinize such well-meaning but ill-
advised plans that wandered over the fuzzy border separating 
public health from private medical care.35
For physicians in the ISMS, a central goal running through 
all of the economic, social, scientific, and international upheav-
als of the 1930s and 1940s was to remain, as Dr. Fay said, “un-
shackled by bureaucratic control” while the profession and the 
practice of medicine was changing all around them. Yet, despite 
the bravado of several outspoken leaders, there were just too 
many factors that independent, individualistic physicians could 
not control on their own. To resist “outside” dictates, they had 
to face head on the increasingly unpleasant conflicts among ide-
alized professional altruism, providing the best in up-to-date 
science-based diagnostic tests and treatments, and the financial 
bottom line: people who needed medical care could not, or 
would not, pay their bills. 
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Medical Care and Poverty before the New Deal 
Ralph Simmons, editor of the ISMS Journal, welcomed 1931 with 
an optimistic editorial, looking back on 1930 as a year “marked 
by prosperity and much personal happiness” in the Midwest, 
despite some “economic stress.” Economic stress continued, 
however, and Iowa physicians began to feel it keenly. At the 
annual meeting of the ISMS in April, Dr. Hearst reported to 
the society’s House of Delegates on the activities of the recently 
formed Committee on Indigent Physicians. Only a few poverty-
stricken physicians had been identified, he said, but “it has been 
intimated that if the bulls don’t get busy in the stock market 
there will be more of this class.” A year later Dr. Hearst told the 
delegates that no one had yet reported any indigent physicians 
requiring assistance from the state society. “The various county 
societies had taken care” of needy colleagues, he noted. In 1933, 
however, requests for aid had come in from three practitioners. 
Dr. Ambor, then chair of the committee, found one “to require 
emergency action.” The ISMS Board of Trustees authorized a 
temporary payment of $25 per month from the society’s reserve 
funds for this “truly needy physician.” Critical members of the 
society’s House of Delegates, discovering that the decision vio-
lated the society’s bylaws, challenged Dr. Ambor at the annual 
ISMS meeting in 1934. Dr. Fay, for example, asked the House, 
“Are you going into the insurance game and take care of these 
people?” “Who is going to determine whether they are indigent 
or whether they are not?” The House finally voted to disband 
the committee and abandon any formal ISMS help for indigent 
practitioners. Impoverished physicians, like so many others who 
just could not manage as conditions worsened in towns and on 
farms across the state, would have to rely on their neighbors, 
charity, and public aid to get by.36
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Between 1929 and 1932, the national average net income for 
physicians in independent private practice dropped almost 44 
percent, from $5,224 per year to $2,948. After 1932, however, the 
average gradually rose again until, in 1943, the mean income 
after business expenses reached $6,735.37 Most Iowa physicians 
managed to make do through the leanest years in areas not af-
fected too keenly by the ongoing droughts. According to a sur-
vey that the ISMS Journal sent out to members in 1935, just un-
der two-thirds of Iowa physicians owned one car (“a Ford or a 
Chevrolet”), which was two or more years old; the rest owned 
two cars. Seventy-five percent owned electric refrigerators, 40 
percent were planning home improvements, and most had kept 
up payments on their life insurance policies. The author of the 
report on this questionnaire regretted that it had not gathered 
reliable information on the average Iowa physician’s income, as, 
“alas, his earnings and his collections are so widely different 
that it is too uncertain to estimate.”38
The difference between earnings on paper, tallied according 
to fees charged, and what a physician actually collected in cash 
(or kind) had burdened practitioners for hundreds of years. 
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century physicians were no 
strangers to poverty or marginal incomes when they could not 
attract enough well-to-do patients who paid their bills promptly 
and fully. Physicians regularly extended personal credit to their 
patients and arranged payment schedules that could keep their 
clientele in debt to them for years. In the 1920s and 1930s, how-
ever, the cost of being a physician and running an independent 
practice had risen dramatically with the reform of medical edu-
cation and the introduction of expensive equipment for the doc-
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This image of a doctor’s office in Scranton in about 1940 represents a 
fairly typical “modern” doctor’s office of the time. Photo from the Farm 
Security Administration Collection, Library of Congress. 
 
tor’s office. Keeping up with the latest developments, moreover, 
required society dues, journal subscriptions, and, most of all, 
travel to medical meetings, postgraduate courses, and refresher 
clinics. Juggling expenses and income in these decades meant 
that the physician had to learn to be a sound businessperson. As 
one Iowa practitioner put it in 1933, “We have not yet learned to 
cause our fees to collect in pens about our home so that when 
they are needed we know that they are in the pen ready for us.” 
Instead, like hunting wild game, ordinary doctors had to stalk 
their fees—a laborious and inefficient task. By the mid-1920s, 
some collection agencies specialized in getting payments from 
patients for a percentage of the bills owed. Physicians turned to 
such agencies when they simply could not afford to write off all 
of their bad debts, but this must have been an uncomfortable 
process in close-knit communities.39
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The “National School of Honesty” advertised regularly 
in the Journal of the Iowa State Medical Society in 
the 1930s and 1940s. This ad appeared in March 1935. 
 
Physicians’ problems with fees and payments also stemmed 
from another long-standing tradition in medical practice: the 
sliding scale and physicians’ personal generosity with their time. 
It was well known that physicians charged their poorer patients 
less for the same services than they charged those with adequate 
means, and that sometimes they charged nothing at all. By the 
late 1920s, the individual physician’s freedom to use a sliding 
scale and extend credit had created considerable dissension in 
the profession. On one hand, physicians prized their flexibility 
with payment as part of their autonomy as practitioners and as 
a fundamental expression of the altruism of medicine itself. In-
dependence in caring for those in need according to their own 
clinical judgments without regard for personal gain was a 
deeply held value, intertwined with feelings about self-respect 
and community regard. Practitioners feared that talk of busi-
ness efficiency and payment demands threatened their patients’ 
trust in them and stimulated public opinion that doctors were 
arrogant and money-grubbing. On the other hand, the variation 
in physicians’ fees had long been seen as fueling competition 
among practitioners and encouraging quackery, contract prac-
tice, incompetent medical care, and bitter divisiveness in the 
profession. The very altruism that gave physicians pride, more-
Iowa Physicians      25 
over, “gives the layman a chance to play us for ‘suckers,’ if he so 
chooses,” Dr. Wurtzer of Clear Lake noted in 1931. “Some of the 
disrespect and disregard that some of the people have for the 
medical profession,” Dr. Wurtzer continued, “is due . . . in part 
to our slothful methods of business dealings with the public.”40
Concern over physicians’ billing autonomy versus the col-
lective good of the profession was one of the issues motivating 
the formation of medical societies, including the American Med-
ical Association, in the nineteenth century. Some city and county 
medical societies occasionally put together suggested fee sched-
ules suitable for their areas, but prosperous practitioners and 
specialists complained that “suggested” fees too quickly be-
came “maximum” fees and that “cheap doctors” were always 
willing to undercut respectable ones.41  
Society-based fee schedules as a partial solution to the wide 
variation in medical charges also became problematic with the 
passage of workers’ compensation laws in the first decades of 
the twentieth century. Iowa’s law passed in 1913 and went into 
effect on July 1, 1914.42 Such laws required that employers pay 
for the medical care and time off required when an industrial 
worker was injured on the job and it was not the worker’s fault. 
(The law did not apply to farm labor, nor did it include work-
related diseases.) To fund this responsibility, Iowa employers 
established a private insurance association (the Employers Mu-
tual Casualty Association of Iowa), which entered into contracts 
with physicians around the state to provide medical services as 
the need arose, with a legislated limit of $100 for medical costs 
per injury. The insurance association determined which physi-
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cian took care of an injured employee and, with the contract 
system, also determined the fees. The association argued that 
since physicians would be assured of prompt payment, they 
should be happy with half their normal charge—indeed, what 
they might have expected a worker to be able to pay anyway. 
Fee schedules generated by county medical societies provided 
evidence that insurance companies used to establish the cus-
tomary charges that they could discount.43
Physicians’ responses to workers’ compensation in Iowa her-
alded later reactions to legislative solutions to managing health 
care and medical practice. Some were horrified and adamantly 
denounced all forms of contract practice, but offered few ideas 
about what should be done about it or about workers’ compen-
sation laws. Others counseled cooperation with the state and 
insurance companies, as interference with medical costs was in-
evitable, given all the political discussion about European sys-
tems of state medicine for industrial workers and the popular 
lure of “free” health care. Still others urged action and physi-
cian solidarity. The physicians of Poweshiek County, for exam-
ple, banded together in 1916 and refused to sign any contracts 
with the Employers Mutual Casualty Association. Those who 
handled casualty cases in the county were “getting decent, re-
spectable fees for their work” as a result of their unified resis-
tance. Getting all local physicians to cooperate, however, was a 
daunting task. Contract practice did offer some payment secu-
rity, after all. It allowed “young men to obtain a start” in busi-
ness and, of course, provided an income to those who could not 
get patients any other way. Insurance companies, observed Dr. 
Wahrer of Fort Madison in 1915, “know they can find a taker” 
in contrast to “butchers, grocers, brick layers, carpenters, farm-
                                                 
43. D. S. Fairchild, “The Effects of the Workmen’s Compensation Law on the 
Profession,” JISMS 6 (1916), 161; “Report of the Committee on Workmen’s 
Compensation,” JISMS 7 (1917), 284; Oliver J. Fay, “The Relation of the Doctor 
to the Iowa Workmen’s Compensation Service,” JISMS 9 (1919), 120–21, 124–
25. By the early 1930s, the ISMS’s Committee on Medical Economics had the 
task of negotiating a recommended statewide minimum fee schedule for all 
compensation cases. See “Report of the Committee on Medical Economics,” 
JISMS 23 (1933), 414–16. For details on the management of workers’ compen-
sation in specific cases in Iowa, see A. B. Funk, “Report of Decisions by the De-
partment and State Courts,” in State of Iowa, Report of Workmen’s Compen-
sation Service, 1930, Legislative Documents, vol. 3. 
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ers, char-women, scavengers or motormen,” who, he implied, 
had more sense. “Above everything else,” Dr. Schilling urged, 
“the doctor should maintain his self-respect, and when one of 
these contracts is presented to him and it involves the degrada-
tion of his profession, he should refuse to sign it.”44
Smoldering alongside resentment of workers’ compensation 
contract practice was similar animosity toward contract practice 
for the care of the indigent sick in Iowa’s counties. By state law 
every county was responsible for supporting indigent residents 
with the minimal necessities of life, including basic medical 
treatment, paid for by county taxes and managed by the 
county’s board of supervisors.45 In 1928 all but two of Iowa’s 
counties had a poor farm, where those with no other options 
were sent. Such residential facilities were considered the most 
cost-effective way of feeding and sheltering the homeless indi-
gent, along with the aged and disabled whose families (if they 
had family) did not have enough resources to care for them. 
The able-bodied on the farms labored with stock and crops, but 
sales of their produce rarely covered the expenses for maintain-
ing the property, providing clothing and food for the inmates, 
and paying for medicine and doctors’ visits.46 Counties also 
used “outdoor” relief, that is, payments for those who still had 
their own homes but no means of support, such as women with 
dependent children. In addition, counties had to pay for the 
                                                 
44. “The Doctor’s Economic Relationship,” JISMS 10 (1920), 123–26; Donald L. 
Madison, “Preserving Individualism in the Organizational Society: ‘Coopera-
tion’ and American Medical Practice, 1900–1920,” Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine 70 (1996), 442–83; Fairchild, “Effects of the Workmen’s Compensation 
Law,” 158–63; Clinton E. Harris, “Co-operation: What does it Mean?” JISMS 6 
(1916), 10, 163.  
45. Marilyn Olson, “Sick and Poor in Cedar County: Local Government and 
the Poorhouse, 1857–1890,” unpublished paper presented at the Newberry 
Library Seminar in Rural History, 2/24/2007. Olson provides important data 
on how a county government dealt with paying physicians for the care of the 
poor in the nineteenth century.  
46. Report of the Auditor of State for the Biennial Period Ending June 30, 1930 (Des 
Moines, 1930). Tables 12 and 13 give county home expenses and income from 
the sale of produce for 1928, for example. In 1928, 97 of Iowa’s 99 counties had 
poor farms, with 2,425 poor and 1,459 insane inmates; one county had a farm 
where indigents worked, but the building for the residents had been con-
demned. Costs for medicine and medical attendance for county home resi-
dents totaled $29,247, or 2.2 percent of the $1,310,183 expended.  
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The Lucas County Poor Farm in Chariton was typical of those in all but 
two Iowa counties. Photo from State Historical Society of Iowa (SHSI). 
 
cost of resident indigents confined in one of the state hospitals 
for the insane. The voters of each county decided on the tax rate 
for poor relief. Most counties were reasonably generous, levy-
ing more for the poor than for county road building in 1928, for 
instance, but others were decidedly parsimonious.47  
When faced with seriously ill indigent children and adults, 
county authorities could send them to the UI hospital, where 
their medical costs would be covered by state funds under the 
Perkins Law and the Haskell-Klaus Law, up to a mandated cap 
of one million dollars per year.48 In the late 1920s and early 
1930s, problems with the ways some counties used more than 
their fair share of Perkins-Haskell-Klaus support, concern that 
patients who could be treated locally—with local physicians 
and hospitals deserving the income—were being sent away un-
necessarily, rumors that some patients were not really indigent, 
and the start of long waiting lists for beds in Iowa City led to in- 
                                                 
47. State Board of Assessment and Review, Taxable Valuation of Property (Des 
Moines, 1929). Table 2, Part IV breaks down all taxes levied for 1928. The mills 
assessed for the poor ranged from the unusually low .55 for Osceola County to 
a high of 3.01 for Van Buren; the majority of counties assessed 3.00 mills for 
poor relief. 
48. Lawrence, “Iowa Physicians,” part two, 24, 43. 
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FIGURE 2 
TAX-FUNDED HEALTH CARE FOR THE INDIGENT IN IOWA: 
UI HOSPITALS (PERKINS & HASKELL-KLAUS) ALLOCATION 
COMPARED WITH TOTAL COUNTY EXPENDITURES 
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SOURCES: Compiled from State of Iowa, Report of the Auditor of State, for biennial peri-
ods ending in even years, 1926–1950. The health care costs for the county poor include 
physicians’ fees, hospital and nursing charges, and drug costs for poor farm residents 
and those on outdoor relief. 
 
vestigations by the state legislature and the ISMS. Negotiations 
among university administrators, medical society leaders, and 
state legislators led to reforms in the committal procedures to 
prevent abuses, but the cap in funding to the university hospital 
during the Depression meant that counties could not rely on the 
state’s hospitals to relieve them of all the costs of their sickest 
poor (see fig. 2).49 As the state’s auditors’ reports reveal, local ex- 
                                                 
49. Levey et al., University Teaching Hospital, 146-65, covers this controversy in 
detail from the University Hospital’s perspective. This account does not dis-
cuss county-level work for the medical needs of the indigent. See also “Report 
of the Committee on Medical Economics,” JISMS 21 (1931), 393; “Iowa Assem-
bly Investigates University Hospital,” JISMS 23 (1933), 221–25; “Supplemen-
tary Report of the Committee on Medical Education and Hospitals,” JISMS 23 
(1933), 400–404; Bowen, “The Present Status of Medicine,” 146; Gordon F. 
Harkness, “The President Elect’s Address: Why Are We Here and Where Are 
We Going?” JISMS 24 (1934), 274–77. 
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FIGURE 3 
EXPENDITURES ON MEDICAL CARE BY IOWA COUNTIES, 1925–1950, 
FOR THE POOR OUTSIDE OF POOR FARMS/COUNTY HOMES 
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SOURCE: Compiled from State of Iowa, Report of the Auditor of State, for biennial peri-
ods ending in even years, 1926–1950. Professional services include fees for physicians 
and dentists. These figures do not include amounts indirectly paid for medical services 
through FERA or FSA programs. 
 
penditures on health care climbed significantly in this period, just 
as payments for fuel, food, and clothing for the poor also rose 
(see fig. 3). 
Most county boards tried to budget a fixed amount for local 
indigent medical costs and, physicians constantly complained, 
tried to pay as little as possible for them. One popular method 
from the 1870s through the 1930s was to ask local physicians to 
submit sealed bids for an annual contract for services to the in-
digent and to accept the lowest one. Other county boards simply 
paid whatever fraction of the bills that physicians submitted that 
the boards thought the care was worth, which was nearly al-
ways 50 percent or less.50 The AMA and the ISMS officially de-
                                                 
50. Olson, “Sick and Poor in Cedar County;” Harris, “Co-operation: What 
Does It Mean?” 10; AMA, Care of the Indigent Sick, 33–36. 
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plored contract practice for indigent care, with one notable ex-
ception: when all of the physicians in a county medical society 
joined together to bid, as a group, for the contract. If voluntarily 
taken on by organized medicine, a contract that excluded phy-
sicians who did not belong to the AMA was considered profes-
sionally acceptable, as long as all AMA-affiliated physicians 
could participate. Because this unusual idea was dreamed up in 
Iowa, such a collective contract became nationally known as the 
“Iowa Plan” by the early 1930s.51  
The physicians of the Black Hawk County Medical Society tried 
sonal financial responsibility of the society’s officers, and, by 
this collective initiative in 1907, well before the hard times of the 
Depression.52 In that year, they voted “to go before the county 
board of supervisors at the April meeting, and to underbid 
anyone who put in a bid to do the county poor work.” The su-
pervisors agreed to their proposal, and the medical society got 
the contract for $830 per year. Within a few years, “the physi-
cians of Cedar Falls and Hudson preferred to make their own 
arrangements to care for the poor in their respective townships,” 
and the Waterloo Medical Society also decided that working at 
the city and township level made the most sense in Black Hawk 
County. In 1912 the Waterloo Medical Society decided to incor-
porate as a non-profit organization in order to reduce the per-
1916, had used the contract funds for a variety of projects useful 
                                                 
51. Leland, “Some Causes of Professional Unrest,” 604. The use of the phrase 
“Iowa Plan” by physicians may easily be confused with the “Iowa Plan” de-
veloped by the Bureau of Social Welfare in the Extension Division of the State 
University of Iowa to have professional social workers coordinate all public 
and private relief efforts at the city or county level. See Bessie McClenahan, 
The Iowa Plan for the Combination of Public and Private Relief (Iowa City, 1918); 
Louise Cottrell, Iowa Plan for the Organization of a County Social Service League 
(Iowa City, 1924), and Ina Tyler, comp., The Iowa Plan for the County Organiza-
tion of Social Work (Iowa City, 1931). There may well be connections between 
these “Iowa Plans,” but physicians do not acknowledge them in the articles 
cited here. 
52. According to data provided by Robert A. Parker in “Care of the Indigent 
Sick by Medical Society Contract,” JISMS 21 (1931), 17, the Hardin County 
Medical Society started its collective contract arrangement in 1904. This has 
not yet been confirmed in the county’s board of supervisors records. This ear-
lier venture was not mentioned in the first accounts about county medical 
society contracts published in the JISMS cited below. 
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for society members and the community. They set up x-ray ser-
vices in two Waterloo hospitals and equipped a clinical labora-
tory in town, for example, which were supposed to eventually 
generate enough fees to be self-supporting.53
Only 11 local medical societies had county contracts in 1930 
(see table 3), but by 1933, 30 local medical societies had taken 
on the responsibility for local indigent care, based on an annual 
fixe
 
org
                                                
d sum or on a negotiated percentage of the minimum fee 
schedule devised by the ISMS that year.54 In a decided show of 
communal good will, moreover, before 1933 most of the socie-
ties put some or all of the county contract funds into the soci-
ety’s treasury, where it was used to cover members’ dues to the 
ISMS. The societies spent the remaining money on expenses for 
their meetings, particularly to bring in outside speakers for their 
programs.55 The Jefferson County Medical Society even used 
this income to pay its members’ premiums for group malprac-
tice insurance, a nice inducement for non-members to join up.56
Dr. Parker of Des Moines, reporting on the 11 medical soci-
ety county contracts operating in 1930, stressed how much this 
collective use of contract funds helped in “the advancement of
anized medicine,” as it enhanced “the unity and fellowship 
among the members.” Most reports from the county medical so- 
cieties presented at the annual meetings of the ISMS in the early 
1930s confirmed Dr. Parker’s rosy assessment, although a few 
were less cheerful. Dr. Stirlen bluntly stated in 1934 that raising 
the idea to seek a county contract in 1933 “was the beginning of 
 
53. W. B. Small, “President’s Address—Iowa State Medical Society: An Experi-
ence in Medical Co-operation,” JISMS 6 (1916), 241–43. 
54. “Report of the Medical Economics Committee,” JISMS 23 (1933), 364; “Re-
port of the Secretary,” JISMS 24 (1934), 352. For an example of a contract, see 
“Excellent Contract for Guthrie County Indigent Sick,” JISMS 22 (1932), 147–
48. For brief descriptions of meetings to discuss negotiations with the county 
board of supervisors, see meetings of 1/27/1928 and 5/22/1930 in the Bremer 
County Medical Society Records, 1903–1950, State Historical Society of Iowa, 
Iowa City. These efforts do not seem to have been successful. A mimeo-
graphed copy of the 1933 ISMS fee bill was pasted into this volume, as well. 
55. Parker, “Care of the Indigent Sick by Medical Society Contract,” 17. A ver-
sion of this report was published in the American Medical Association Bulletin 
the month before it appeared in the state journal.  
56. “Reports from Councilor Districts,” JISMS 21 (1931), 373. 
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our troubles” in the Keokuk County Medical Society. “It nearly 
caused the death of the Society,” he claimed, but at least it suc-
ceeded in bringing “to the surface the men who are for organized 
medicine and those who are for their own selfish purposes.”57
The contract arrangements for seeing patients varied consid-
erably, but before 1934 all of them allowed patients free choice 
from among the physicians who belonged to the society. To at-
tend
 the way 
som
                                                
 to patients who did not have a chosen practitioner, some 
societies rotated their members through periods of service; oth-
ers expected the closest physician to handle cases as they came 
up. In Davenport, Sioux City, and Des Moines, the county med-
ical societies established clinics staffed by volunteers, in which 
specialists contributed their services to indigent patients referred 
from a general practitioner. Whatever the details of the contract, 
county societies frequently reported how much the services they 
provided were worth compared with the amount they were paid. 
The Muscatine County Medical Society noted, for example, that 
in 1932 it dispensed $13,877 worth of work for a $3,600 contract. 
That was hardly satisfactory, but a few societies discovered that 
if they insisted on better terms without complete cooperation 
from all physicians, then the board of supervisors would give 
the contract to a single practitioner or simply dealt with indi-
vidual physicians’ claims for payment as they came in, with 
their usual tendency to pay less than the fees billed.58  
As national attention focused on how to deal with the grow-
ing number of people who had lost their livelihoods and could 
barely manage to survive, much less pay for doctors,
e Iowa county medical societies collectively shouldered in-
digent medical care became more widely known. In the final 
report of the national Committee on the Costs of Medical Care 
(1932), its authors briefly described Iowa’s innovation in county- 
 
57. Parker, “Care of the Indigent Sick,” 17; “Reports from Councilor Districts,” 
JISMS 24 (1934), 363. In 1932 the Hamilton County Medical Society named two 
members who “have not signed [the] contract and are not considered members.” 
“Reports from Councilor Districts,” JISMS 23 (1933), 387. 
58. John I. Marker, “The County Contract and Clinic,” JISMS 20 (1930), 86–88; 
“Three Iowa Societies Tackle Health Center Problem,” JISMS 20 (1930), 89; 
“Interesting News,” JISMS 23 (1933), 110; “Reports from Councilor Districts,” 
JISMS 24 (1934), 361–62; “Reports from Councilor Districts,” JISMS 24 (1934), 
359, 361, 363. 
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TABLE 3 (continued on facing page) 
COUNTY CONTRACTS FOR CARE OF THE INDIGENT SICK IN IOWA, 1930 
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TABLE 3 (cont.) 
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Waterloo  
 
Rotate: 60 days service per member 
each year 
 
In society treasury for 
expenses, dues, etc. 
 
Hardin County  
 
Members answer calls from supervisors 
or social worker 
 
In society treasury for 
expenses, dues, etc. 
 
Fort Madison  
 
Rotate each month; each physician 
takes a turn with the next physician as 
alternate 
 
In society treasury for 
expenses, dues, etc. 
 
Webster County  
 
Patient selects physician; authorized by 
welfare society 
 
Pay members on fee 
basis 
 
Marion County  
 
Nearest physician attends case 
 
Pay members on fee 
basis 
 
Marshall County  
 
Patient may choose own physician 
 
In society treasury for 
expenses, dues, etc. 
 
Washington 
County 
 
Each patient selects own physician 
 
In society treasury for 
expenses, dues, etc. 
 
Jefferson County  
 
Eight members rotate monthly; two 
eye, ear, nose, and throat doctors 
 
In society treasury for 
expenses, dues, etc. 
 
Mahaska County  
 
Cases rotate; each physician follows 
each case to completion 
 
In society treasury for 
expenses, dues, and 
society endowment 
 
Scott County  
 
Rotating staff at clinic/dispensary 
 
In society treasury for 
expenses, dues, etc.  
 
Council Bluffs  
 
One physician answers emergency and 
house calls. Rotate 3-month periods at 
dispensary and hospital 
 
In society treasury 
 
SOURCE: Robert L. Parker, “Care of the Indigent Sick by Medical Society Contract,” 
JISMS 21 (1931), 18–19. See Parker’s article for the full table, which includes information 
on the coverage of major surgery, minor surgery, venereal diseases, and cost of serums, 
antitoxins, and medicines. 
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level indigent care, but criticized it as “not well-integrated” with 
other services, especially hospital care, and poor in its attention to 
“preventive work.” Medical society contract practice for the in-
digent provided “inadequate” compensation for physicians and, 
perhaps most damning, was found, “with one exception, only in 
small rural communities.” The committee had sought solutions 
to concerns about access to up-to-date health services for all 
Americans, so it is not surprising that they did not see much 
promise in medical society contracts that were limited to care of 
the very poor. The American Medical Association, in contrast, 
praised the “Iowa Plan” for its creative response to indigent 
needs and championed it as a model for managing the expan-
sion of state and federal funding that came with the election of a 
liberal, Democratic president promising a “New Deal.”59  
 
“Government” Medicine: 
The New Deal and Organized Medicine in Iowa 
One of President Roosevelt’s first steps in office in 1933 was to 
secure passage of the Federal Emergency Relief Act, which gave 
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) a sweep-
ing mandate to relieve Americans’ economic distress by putting 
the unemployed back to work and, where absolutely necessary, 
sending direct aid to destitute communities. Iowa first received 
funds via Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and Civil Works 
Administration (CWA) employment projects in the late winter 
and early spring of 1933–34.60 Federal funds were channeled 
through the Iowa Emergency Relief Administration (IERA), the 
                                                 
59. Leland, “Some Causes of Professional Unrest,” 604; “Medical Society Ex-
periments in Care of the Indigent,” JISMS 29 (1939), 517; Medical Care for the 
American People, 74–75; “Report of the Secretary,” JISMS 25 (1935), 356; AMA, 
Care of the Indigent Sick, 40, 49–50. 
60. The regulations for CWA work required that the government pay for med-
ical care for employees injured on the job or made ill by diseases caused by the 
occupation. ISMS physicians were pleasantly surprised by the CWA rules, as 
they specified that local administrators had to “consult the officers of their 
county or district medical society” to set up medical aid and to pay for “rea-
sonable medical and hospital services and supplies.” “Medical Care of CWA 
Workmen,” JISMS 24 (1934), 108; Oliver J. Fay, “The Test of Organized Medi-
cine,” JISMS 24 (1934), 206. For CCC work, see “Physicians Wanted,” JISMS 24 
(1934), 586. 
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state government agency responsible for coordinating relief ef-
forts, ensuring compliance with FERA (and other) regulations, 
dealing with disputes among counties, collecting data on needi-
ness, and monitoring how money was spent. By early 1935, more 
than one-third of Iowa’s county governments were essentially 
bankrupt, having reached the maximum amount that they 
could borrow against the promise of future tax revenues.61
FERA regulations emphasized the importance of working 
with state and local professional societies for medicine, phar-
macy, and nursing when setting up plans to deal with health 
needs, especially when devising fee schedules for local services. 
Any medical plans were to respect the “traditional family and 
family-physician relationship” as far as possible, with care to 
maintain a minimum level “consistent with good professional 
judgment.”62 By the end of 1934, ISMS officers were deep into 
discussions with the IERA directors about ways to support 
county medical relief budgets with state and FERA funds. IERA 
administrators appointed Dr. Thomas C. Denny, who had spent 
most of his career employed by the Central Life Assurance Com-
pany of Iowa, as director of IERA medical services. He was a 
fortunate choice, according to the ISMS leadership, as he under-
stood physicians’ points of view, but his task was not an easy 
one. If a county accepted state and federal money, it had to sign 
on to a centrally regulated program. A certain percentage of the 
total relief funds coming into each county would be targeted for 
all medical needs, “and there will be no addition.” The central 
relief office set up “an emergency fee schedule,” as well. Dr. 
Denny stressed that these were “to be accepted as no criterion 
whatsoever of what a proper fee arrangement should be.” Indi-
vidual physicians had to sign on to the agreement in order to be 
“eligible to give medical relief service.”63 The federal government 
                                                 
61. Report of the Activities of the Iowa Emergency Relief Administration for the Period 
January 1933 through December 1934 (Des Moines, 1935), 7. Reports were also 
printed in 1936 (for 1935), 1937 (for 1936), and 1938 (for 1937). 
62. AMA, Care of the Indigent Sick, 48, quoting from the 1933 FERA Rules and 
Regulations. 
63. Gordon F. Harkness, “The President’s Interim Report to the Members,” 
JISMS 25 (1935), 3–4; “Medical Relief in Iowa,” JISMS 25 (1935), 100; T. C. 
Denny, “Medical Relief Program,” JISMS 25 (1935), 153–55. See also Report of 
the Activities of the IERA (1936), 22–23. 
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dissolved the FERA in 1935, largely because it simply was not 
working, but Iowa continued to maintain its own office to co-
ordinate emergency relief and distribute meager state funds to 
needy counties. 
Throughout the rest of the 1930s, local arrangements for in-
digent medical care varied according to the disparities in eco-
nomic recovery in different parts of the state, the degree of or-
ganization within county medical societies, and the cordiality 
(or lack thereof) between physicians and county boards of su-
pervisors. In the poorest areas, physicians seemed resigned to 
get what they could simply to support themselves; in other areas 
conditions were “exceptionally satisfactory” by 1936.64 It did 
not help that physicians in Van Buren County received nearly 
100 percent of their billed fees for medical relief work while 
their county was on the IERA relief roll, but Page County IERA 
authorities imposed large across-the-board cuts on physicians’ 
charges in that county. “The medical profession is the only 
group which is asked . . . to accept payment on such an unsatis-
factory basis,” observed Dr. Treynor of Pottawattamie County. 
Such complaints ended up in the lap of the ISMS leadership, es-
pecially the members of the Committee on Medical Economics, 
who tried to resolve them at the state level.65  
In 1937 the ISMS Committee on Medical Economics con-
fronted representatives of the Rural Resettlement Administra-
tion (reorganized into the Farm Security Administration [FSA] 
later that year) over yet another plan that threatened to alienate 
Iowa doctors even further. The FSA was set up to make limited 
outright grants and systematic loans to farmers for the supplies 
they needed to get back into production under a quota system 
for agricultural products. The watchword was rehabilitation, 
not relief. Medical expenses were not included in the budgets 
drawn up with FSA agents, and physicians discovered that 
farmers who promised to pay them when their FSA loan checks 
came in always seemed to spend all their cash before putting 
some towards the doctor’s bills. That was not unusual, of course, 
                                                 
64. Ernest E. Shaw, “Various Medical Relief Plans in Iowa,” JISMS 27 (1937), 
589–91; “Reports from Councilor Districts,” JISMS 27 (1937), 340. 
65. “Reports from Councilor Districts,” JISMS 27 (1937), 340, 343; “Report of 
the Committee on Medical Economics,” JISMS 27 (1937), 349–50.  
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but the physicians expected that since the farmers were enrolled 
in a federal program, one that promised rehabilitation and en-
sured that their clients paid full price for seed and stock, they 
should wisely include medical care under the necessities of 
life.66  
Because there were relatively few FSA clients in Iowa com-
pared with the numbers in other states, the ISMS reluctantly 
agreed to a new, rather experimental plan, which the medical 
societies in Wayne and Crawford counties accepted on a trial 
basis. Each farmer in the loan program was to come up with an 
annual family medical budget in consultation with his or her 
regular physician, using the ISMS fee schedule and excluding 
estimates for surgery. That amount would be added to the loan 
and the funds deposited with a “bonded trustee” picked by the 
county medical society. If, at the end of the year, funds remained, 
they would be returned to the client. If, on the other hand, the 
family needed additional care, the physician would have to 
provide it without charge.67
The description of this arrangement published in the ISMS 
Journal stressed that it was merely proper budgeting and saving, 
which all families should do, rather than a pre-payment plan of 
any sort.68 But it was yet another system that left physicians both 
underpaid and providing free service for unanticipated needs. 
By the end of 1938, the ISMS Medical Economics Committee 
and the state FSA administrators agreed that the medical funds 
budgeted for all FSA clients in a county would be deposited as 
a pooled account with a bonded representative chosen by the 
county medical society. That money would be used to cover 
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medical costs, including emergency surgery but not expensive 
drugs (such as insulin) or operations for stable chronic condi-
tions (such as hernia), based on a discounted fee schedule. At 
the end of year, the county medical society could keep any sur-
plus or, as usual, the physicians who cared for the FSA clients 
would file their unpaid bills with their other uncollectible debts.69 
It was, obviously, an insurance plan—and an insurance plan 
involving federal money, with lay employees of the govern-
ment monitoring it in the background. 
Several county delegates at the 1939 ISMS annual meeting 
were appalled. Stories about the FSA program had circulated in 
the state: physicians were only getting ten cents on the dollar 
for their work; clients burdened doctors with trivial calls and 
demands; FSA clients were not officially indigent, so their 
neighbors expected the same reduced charges. “If there ever 
was a step made toward state medicine, this is it,” proclaimed 
Dr. Harman, a general practitioner from Whiting (pop. 627), to 
the ISMS House of Delegates. The plan had received “unholy 
publicity . . . through the editorials in the Des Moines Register,” 
presumably with the permission of the ISMS. “Look at the Da-
kotas and Oklahoma and see what has happened,” Dr. Harman 
continued, pointing to states where physicians had resigned 
themselves to participate in large-scale FSA-run medical collec-
tives. His county medical society (Monona, in far western Iowa) 
had refused to have anything to do with the FSA program, and 
he wanted the ISMS to refuse to accept it anywhere in the state. 
Others urged the delegates to see the counties trying the FSA 
plan simply as “an experimental laboratory.” The plan was not 
being forced on every county with FSA clients; that decision re-
mained in the control of the county medical societies, and phy-
sicians were not required to participate, although they would 
have to give up their FSA patients if they refused.  
Dr. Shaw, the beleaguered chair of the Medical Economics 
Committee, reminded the meeting that the House of Delegates 
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had asked the committee to look into pre-payment plans. “There 
are some doctors who believe we must go ahead with plans if 
we are to forestall state medicine,” he noted. At the end of this 
acerbic discussion, the House of Delegates voted not to accept 
the section of the Medical Economics Committee’s report cov-
ering the FSA system, which was tantamount to censuring the 
committee’s work that would have allowed the plan to be im-
plemented in two of Iowa’s counties. That action did not stop 
the plans, but it certainly removed the Medical Economics Com-
mittee’s ability to negotiate effectively with FSA administrators 
on behalf of the ISMS membership. After that, county medical 
societies dealt with FSA proposals on their own.70
Dr. Harman’s ire at the FSA group pre-payment plan rep-
resents the effect of decades of pronouncements from the AMA, 
the ISMS, and hundreds of physicians who denounced all forms 
of contract practice, pre-payment plans, voluntary insurance, and 
compulsory insurance, whether organized by private companies 
or by the government. Any arrangement that might involve reg-
ulated oversight of the financial relationship between an indi-
vidual practitioner and his or her individual patient spelled 
ruin for medicine, proclaimed the loudest voices. Identifying 
pre-payment plans that would require any form of tax support 
for employed people as “socialistic” played on diffuse political 
and cultural fears of threats to American democracy and indi-
vidualism from the early days of World War I.71 Voluntary in-
surance plans, the argument went, inevitably led to compulsory 
ones, and hence straight into state medicine. In the late 1920s, 
when workers’ compensation laws in some states expanded to 
cover medical care for specific industrial diseases, physicians 
bemoaned this tiny slide down the slippery slope. The expan-
sion of veterans’ benefits in 1924 to cover medical costs due to 
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some non–war-related disabilities after World War I similarly 
pointed to a dire future.72
At the same time that federal politicians and administrators 
were implementing projects to deal with emergency conditions 
in the early years of the New Deal, Roosevelt’s coterie also 
launched plans for longer-term programs for the unemployed, 
disabled, and elderly. At the start, these plans included a system 
of national health insurance, which immediately encountered 
determined resistance from the leaders of the AMA. Iowa’s Dr. 
Walter Bierring, who had retired from active medical practice 
to serve as the Commissioner of the State Department of Health 
in 1933, was president of the AMA in 1934–35, and Roosevelt’s 
Committee on Economic Security appointed him as a member 
of its Medical Advisory Board in the fall of 1934. Bierring later 
claimed that the Medical Advisory Board had played a key role 
in keeping health insurance out of the draft legislation that the 
Committee on Economic Security presented in January 1935. 
Certainly that blue-ribbon panel had influence, as did the strong 
position the AMA adopted, at a special session of its House of 
Delegates in February 1935 over which Bierring presided, “to 
condemn all efforts at regimentation of the medical profession 
and lay control of medical practice.”73  
The final provisions of the Social Security Act, which Roose-
velt signed on August 14, 1935, did bring unemployment insur-
ance, disability insurance, and old-age pensions to Americans, 
along with federal resources for some health-related needs, es-
pecially those of children. Title V and Title VI provided grants-
in-aid (some requiring matching state funds) for maternal and 
child health, state public health services, hospitalization and 
medical care for crippled children, and support for homeless, 
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Walter Bierring, an important figure in Iowa and 
American medical history, was Commissioner of 
the State Department of Health, 1933–1953, and 
president of the American Medical Association, 
1934–1935. Photo from SHSI. 
 
neglected, and mistreated children. Thomas Burcham, president 
of the ISMS in 1935–36, pronounced all of these worthy meas-
ures. There was a resounding lack of protest in the state journal 
over the next years as Social Security funding—albeit a modest 
amount—paid physicians for diagnostic clinics ($3 per hour) 
and follow-up visits ($1 per visit) for crippled and chronically ill 
children around the state, as well as for treatment at the UI hos-
pital. Money to expand the State Department of Health’s staff, 
to establish county health units with public health nurses, and 
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to offer refresher courses in obstetrics and pediatrics for Iowa 
physicians also came through the Social Security program.74 
With Dr. Bierring as Commissioner of Health (and quite influ-
ential in the way Social Security health resources were distrib-
uted and administered), it is perhaps not surprising that during 
these years Iowa doctors only occasionally expressed fears that 
their expanding public health services competed unfairly with 
private practitioners. The Social Security Act nevertheless ran-
kled physicians, for it represented another step in “govern-
ment controlled services” that, without their constant vigilance, 
would provide the framework for the complete “socialization of 
medicine.”75
The inflated language of some physicians’ warnings in the 
1920s and 1930s, especially when they foresaw that any trajec-
tory toward “socialism” would not stop until “sovietism”—with 
doctors merely state employees subsisting on meager salaries—
did seem hysterical to more sanguine contemporaries, as it has 
to observers in the post–Medicare and Medicaid era. Some have 
interpreted the vehemence of physicians’ expressions largely as 
a rhetorical strategy to frighten Americans into supporting the 
AMA’s official positions on various issues. Because urban spe-
cialists dominated the AMA’s national committees and offices, 
and similar men tended to be chosen as state delegates to AMA 
meetings, AMA positions have regularly been interpreted as 
serving the economic interests of a self-absorbed, wealthy, pro-
fessional elite, and not those of small-town and rural general prac-
titioners. 76  Evidence of disagreements and controversies within 
state medical societies, between state societies and the AMA, 
and between other physicians’ organizations and the AMA in 
the 1930s supports the contention that many ordinary doctors 
were willing to consider both voluntary pre-payment plans and 
some measure of federal funding for medical care quite apart 
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from the emergency conditions brought by the Depression. 
AMA leaders heaped scorn upon physicians who dared to ex-
press such views. Such doctors, Dr. R. G. Leland, then director 
of the AMA’s Bureau of Medical Economics, told the annual 
meeting of the ISMS in 1934, were those “who would sell out 
the medical profession for a mess of pottage.”77  
Iowa physicians, like so many others, had to come to terms 
with the conviction that protecting their independence required 
collective unity and loyalty to the AMA system of county and 
state medical societies, even if they did not agree completely 
with the national organization’s platform.78 Dr. Bowen of Fort 
Dodge urged that dissenting physicians be “controlled first by 
moral suasion, and second, by suspension or expulsion from the 
county society.” Dr. Henry Young, an ophthalmologist from 
Burlington, bluntly laid it out for readers of the ISMS Journal. 
The AMA, he stated, had long pretended to be a “scientific 
body” when its main purpose had really been, and certainly 
was, “politics.” He had been quite satisfied with belonging to 
his specialty societies, and his “twenty years of isolation (out-
side the pale of organized medicine) was, in itself, proof that the 
medical man, seriously and honestly disposed, did not need 
the organization as much as the organization needed him.” But 
conditions had changed. Membership in the AMA, he argued, 
“should be compulsory, under pain of ostracism.” Addressing 
an obvious objection, he continued, “Sounds like trade union-
ism, doesn’t it? Well, like it or not, that’s the least of the degra-
dations impending. Hanging together, in every sense, is better 
than hanging separately.”79
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As Iowa physicians in county medical societies all over the 
state discussed plans to care for the indigent in the early 1930s, 
it is likely that the reality of “government” medicine struck 
home for many of them for the first time. “Government” medi-
cine was not a distant menace, but present down the road in 
meetings of the county board of supervisors and, shortly there-
after, at the offices of county relief agents who were in charge of 
dispensing state and federal aid if the county qualified. When 
the county medical society doctors and local officials got on 
well, with everyone understanding that extremely low fees 
were only a temporary response to an emergency condition, 
then hardship was almost ennobling. Linn County authorities 
and physicians “are enthusiastic about the spirit of unselfish-
ness, self-sacrifice, and willingness to abide by rules intended to 
promote the greatest good for the greatest number,” Dr. Down-
ing reported to the ISMS in 1935. At the other extreme, discord 
gave weight to all the rhetoric about socialized medicine. The 
Pottawattamie County medical society expressed its grievances 
with IERA administration in 1937. “The IERA authorities have 
continued to be rather arbitrary in their promulgation of in-
structions,” Dr. Treynor complained, “usually failing to consult 
the doctor or take him into consideration before such instruc-
tions are issued.” Over and over again, reports from the county 
medical societies confirmed that things worked best when phy-
sicians had as much collective control as possible and worst 
when lay people told them what to do. And lay people from 
outside—outside the community, but especially from outside 
the state—were even harder to take. “Are we to be standard-
ized? Are New York’s problems our problems?” Dr. Harkness 
blustered in 1934. “Do we have to sit supinely by and have sala-
ried employees from a foreign environment, whose very jobs 
depend on the changes they can suggest, come to us, tell us just 
what we should do, and should we blindly accept their decisions 
as gospel truth?”80 Being instructed, not consulted, touched 
doctors’ pride, no matter what ended up in their pockets. 
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Physicians’ experience with indigent care was also shaped 
by their patients’ status as indigent, a formal classification de-
termined by county officials, not by individual practitioners. 
The label carried a stigma that brought contempt as well as 
compassion. A few Iowa physicians articulated attitudes of 
disdain towards those who were “improvident” rather than 
“thrifty.” In 1938 Dr. Harkness noted that Davenport physicians 
acquiesced with the local relief plan, which did not allow indi-
gent patients free choice of physician, because it was “in the in-
terests of economy” that “the recipient of charity, paid for in 
taxes, should be willing to forego this privilege.” Dubuque 
County doctors reported that they willingly accepted the bur-
den of making private arrangements with “families who were 
without funds but who still retained enough American spirit 
and backbone to refuse to ‘go on the county.’” Caring for their 
patients’ dignity enhanced their own. At the same time, this ex-
perience resonated with language that cast every tax-supported 
scheme as socialized medicine, in which “universal paternalistic 
care lowers [the patient’s] self-pride and his standard of citizen-
ship.” With state medicine, “we approach a disguised dole, we 
foster ‘moral gangrene.’”81  
The problem with dignity, however, was that it kept those 
who were not “on the county” from seeking medical help when 
they needed it but could not pay for it. The difficulties that 
people with low or moderate means had paying for acceptable 
medical care, especially when it involved complex surgery, long 
hospital stays, or new drugs, had surfaced as a national concern 
in the 1920s. One response from physicians was simply to casti-
gate people for not saving money properly, a tempting gambit 
when national data from the late 1920s showed that the average 
family spent far more per year on tobacco, candy, soft drinks, 
gum, ice cream, perfume, cosmetics, and nice soap than it did 
on drugs, physicians, hospitals, nurses, and dentists.82 By the 
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early 1930s, however, most doctors knew full well that while 
people with more than marginal incomes managed to afford the 
costs of physicians’ visits for minor illnesses and preventive vac-
cinations, it was the major illnesses and injuries, complex diag-
noses, and difficult chronic conditions that had become unbear-
able financially even as medical help now existed to deal with 
them. As a result, patients stayed away due to fear of the cost. 
“The great middle class of people . . . is composed of decent, 
independent, honest and honorable people,” Dr. Channing 
Smith of Granger reminded his colleagues in December 1933. 
“These people are just as good as you and I, are just as hard 
pressed as we are,” he insisted, “and their problems of medical 
care are our problems as well.” Something had to be done, but, 
Dr. Smith confessed, “I frankly do not know what the answer is 
to these many problems.”83  
Smith was not alone in his frustration. Ordinary physicians 
had a hard enough time keeping their own businesses straight; 
how could they figure out what was to be done to pay for the 
diagnostic tests, drugs, and operations that medicine could pro-
vide? Physicians could modify their own fees based on what they 
knew of their patients’ circumstances, but they had no direct 
control over other costs, including the bills of specialists who 
had to be consulted in large towns and cities. Dr. Harkness told 
his colleagues in 1933 that “lay organizers filled with Utopian 
enthusiasms” had raised their poorer patients’ expectations for 
elaborate care. “The wealthy may pamper themselves with all 
the frills if they so desire,” he stated, “but the mass of people 
should realize their inability to pay for them.” Most people, he 
continued, did not need the “diagnostic frills” that were only 
available in hospitals. Two years later, when Dr. Harkness was 
president of the ISMS, he was adamant that physicians had to 
keep medical relief costs down in order to preserve local control 
over indigent care. “If we neglect this we are inviting socialized 
medicine,” he warned. “There is no justification for rewarding 
indigency with the frills of scientific medicine.”84
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Making physicians largely responsible for medical costs by 
ensuring that tests, drugs, and hospitalization were ordered “ef-
ficiently and not extravagantly” placed a new burden on practi-
tioners providing indigent care through programs run by their 
county medical societies. Physicians now had to be sensitive to 
the drain on funds supervised by their colleagues, funds that 
other physicians depended on for at least some income during 
these difficult years. Many doctors may have shuddered at 
Harkness’s harsh language in regard to the very poor, but they 
could not avoid reiterating the basic message: if you do not 
make these choices, others will do it for you. State scrutiny of 
medical relief costs for the indigent turned up widely varying 
usage patterns, which further increased the pressure on the pro-
fession. “When a director of relief asks why in one county the 
proportionate hospitalization costs are approximately nine times 
(according to the case load of indigency) what they are in a near-
by county,” Harkness warned, “we must be prepared to show 
justification for this difference.” Physicians in at least some of 
Iowa’s county medical societies took on the task of monitoring 
their colleagues’ bills for indigent work. Subcommittees met each 
month to vet members’ charges before they were forwarded to 
the board of supervisors for payment, reducing them if neces-
sary. The occasional frank report from a county medical society 
to the annual meeting of the ISMS House of Delegates demon-
strated that not all members had personally taken cost contain-
ment enough to heart, forcing the society to intervene. In 1938 
the president of the Emmet County Medical Society had to ap-
point a subcommittee to “see that county cases are not overhos-
pitalized and so prevent abuse of funds provided for the hospi-
tal budget.” Dr. Dewey reported that the board of supervisors 
and members of the Sac County Medical Society were not getting 
along as well as they had been in previous years, “due to some 
overpadding of bills and some ruthless cutting of the same.”85
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For many ordinary practitioners in Iowa, the 1930s brought 
the first small taste of external inspection of patient billing, 
apart from any workers’ compensation practice they may have 
had in the 1920s. Physicians active in the county medical socie-
ties with contracts for indigent care discovered that they or their 
peers could review each other’s indigent accounts without in-
tolerable embarrassment or conflict. As debates raged about 
ways to make health care affordable to low- and middle-income 
people, especially the costs of major trauma and sickness, a 
good many Iowa physicians were actually experiencing what it 
was like to try to cooperate with other practitioners to manage 
care for a specific population on a limited budget. At the same 
time, they reacted to the perceived injustices and irritations of 
localized “government” medicine. The call to resist plans for 
state-run medical care by participating in “organized” medi-
cine, the medicine of their county and state medical societies, 
thus drew Iowa’s physicians into the fold. In 1929, 77 percent of 
the state’s practicing physicians belonged to the Iowa State Med-
ical Society (and hence to the AMA); in 1939 membership was 
up to 91 percent; in 1946 it reached 96 percent, where it remained 
through 1950. As the Depression drew to a close, organized 
medicine held firm against tax-funded general medical services 
and, albeit reluctantly, turned to voluntary, private, non-profit 
insurance as the solution to covering the costs of health care for 
Americans. A key point for organized medicine, however, was 
physician control over the principles guiding acceptable medi-
cal plans and physician participation in their governance. This 
ideal gave the ISMS leadership considerable pride—and a great 
many headaches. 
 
Resisting “Government” Medicine: 
Voluntary Health Insurance in Iowa 
The story of the emergence and expansion of what eventually 
became the national Blue Cross and Blue Shield system is a 
complex one. It started with plans for paying for hospital care. 
In 1929 Justin Ford Kimball, an administrator at Baylor Univer-
sity with a background as an insurance lawyer and superinten-
dent of schools in Dallas, devised a non-profit pre-payment plan 
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for Baylor University Hospital to be offered to all the teachers in 
the Dallas school system. The Baylor plan was by no means the 
first hospital-centered group plan, but it is the one that later 
came to be associated with the turning point between sporadic 
efforts and successful long-term growth in non-profit hospital 
insurance. The problems that earlier programs had had with 
competition among hospitals and inadequate numbers of sub-
scribers had convinced skeptics that voluntary hospital pre-
payment plans would never work, especially for small-town 
and rural populations.86 Plans grew steadily in urban areas, 
however, once all or most of the local hospitals joined together 
under the same program and learned how to negotiate with 
employer and labor groups for significant contracts. Through-
out the expansion of community-based, non-profit hospital in-
surance plans, the American Hospital Association (AHA) pro-
vided a clearinghouse for ways to manage income and costs. 
The AHA’s Committee on Hospital Service also established a 
set of essential principles that became formal guidelines in 1937. 
If a plan passed AHA scrutiny every year, it could use a com-
mon seal of approval—the Blue Cross.87
A major sticking point surfaced repeatedly, however. Sub-
scribers expected that coverage of hospital costs should include 
physicians’ services, especially those of radiologists, anesthesi-
ologists, and pathologists, the specialists who worked full-time 
within the hospitals’ walls. In the mid-1930s, the AMA reluc-
tantly accepted the emergence of hospital plans, which it care-
fully called “group hospitalization” rather than “health insur-
ance,” as long as those plans never included any billing or 
payment of physicians’ charges. The slippery slope toward so-
cialism would be avoided “so long as the medical profession 
remains in control.”88 Getting separate, additional bills from 
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physicians for their fees for in-hospital work nevertheless an-
gered and confused patients, who, reconfigured as “consumers” 
when very large employee contracts were at stake, put consid-
erable pressure on hospitalization insurers to provide full-service 
benefits. Those putting together hospital plans in urban areas 
put pressure on physicians, often through their medical societies, 
to come up with some sort of pre-payment program for medical 
care.  
Iowa physicians reading the ISMS Journal found notices 
about the experiments in hospital pre-payment schemes going 
on in Texas, New Jersey, California, and elsewhere in the early 
1930s alongside the more general discussions of relief work and 
threats of socialized medicine.89 The Sentinel Hospital Insurance 
Company started the first hospitalization plan in Iowa late in 
1936. By April 1938, after changing its name to the Iowa Hospi-
tal Service Insurance Company and putting three physicians on 
its board, the company had 2,500 policyholders.90 The ISMS 
Medical Economics Committee decided to “withdraw all sem-
blance of approval of the company,” however, when it became 
a “general casualty company” later that year. At that point, the 
ISMS joined with the Iowa Hospital Association to push for 
legislation to exempt non-profit group hospital insurance from 
some of the requirements imposed on for-profit insurance com-
panies, notably the need to have a $25,000 cash reserve at all 
times.91 Such legislation passed in 1939, and a revised hospital 
insurance plan—Hospital Service, Inc.—formally started on De-
cember 1, 1939, in Des Moines. With genuine non-profit status 
under the new law, Iowa’s Hospital Service, Inc. gained AHA 
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approval in 1940 and, with that, the Blue Cross seal. At the same 
time, however, another non-profit hospital plan, Associated 
Hospital Service, Inc., emerged in Sioux City. In the months be-
fore the two corporations agreed on a boundary between their 
service territories (which basically gave the far northwest corner 
of the state to the Sioux City group), Hospital Service, Inc.’s new 
staff faced the anxiety of competition in what was supposed to 
have been an understood non-profit monopoly. 
The ISMS urged all physicians to join Hospital Service, Inc., 
using county medical societies as the basis for group enrollment. 
“The support of the medical profession . . . will be of great value 
in presenting the service plan to employers and employees in 
the various communities as they are organized,” the Journal edi-
tors declared in March 1940.92 As much as Hospital Service, Inc. 
needed to show that physicians personally approved of the in-
surance, the company also needed the money. Keeping enough 
coming in from premium payments to cover the costs of claimed 
services was, and remained, a major challenge. Over the next 
years, even as war further complicated efforts to deal with med-
ical needs, the plan’s administrators worked to find groups, 
such as farmers’ organizations, that would allow rural inhabi-
tants and the self-employed to enroll, at the same time that they 
sought subscribers among the regularly employed.93  
At the same time that the ISMS leadership was trying to get 
non-profit, voluntary hospital insurance off the ground in the 
state, the society’s delegates agreed that “study and experimen-
tation with voluntary health insurance plans should be under-
taken.” The Medical Economics Committee proceeded to “study” 
such plans off and on for the next six years. In April 1944, when 
it looked as though the end of the war just might be in sight, the 
ISMS House of Delegates finally resolved that a committee had 
to put together a physician-run plan for Iowa within the next few 
months. On November 1, the delegates met in a special session 
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to consider the proposal their colleagues had prepared. A re-
newed sense of urgency spurred the discussion. The threat of 
legislation for national health insurance simply would not go 
away, and state legislatures were starting to consider their own 
compulsory plans. Thousands of “our people” would be com-
ing home after being used to complete medical service in the 
military. The costs of care for serious illness and injuries contin-
ued to burden hard-working families of modest means. Some-
thing had to be done. As important as some of the provisions of 
the first plan were, moreover, the delegates’ primary task was 
far harder—to decide whether they, or the physicians they rep-
resented, really wanted a plan for which the ISMS itself would 
be responsible.94
As ISMS president-elect Dr. Bernard told the meeting, “for 
the first time the State Medical Society is going into business. It 
is going into a business with which a very high percentage of 
the men are unfamiliar.” One of the first steps, indeed, would 
be to get legislation passed that would allow physicians to in-
corporate in the state for business purposes. The State Insurance 
Commissioner would have to approve the plan, and would pay 
particular attention to whether or not it was “actuarially sound.” 
Premiums and costs had to stay low; to manage that the pro-
posal centered on a service-based contract for low-income sub-
scribers, with an indemnity plan for those above a set income. 
Under the service portion, the plan would pay doctors accord-
ing to a set fee bill for their services in hospitals. For those with 
indemnity coverage, the plan would pay doctors the same fee 
bill amount, but the doctors could then charge their patients 
whatever additional fee they felt they deserved for their in-
hospital visits and services. Every physician who signed up to 
be a future provider would have to contribute at least $25 to the 
start-up reserve fund, in addition to an unspecified lump sum 
that the ISMS would give from the society’s savings. If income 
from subscribers did not cover payments to physicians accord-
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ing to the fee bill, moreover, doctors’ compensation would be 
temporarily reduced. The Blue Cross offices, luckily enough, 
had agreed to take on the work of selling the policies—for a rea-
sonable charge—since their staffs were already experienced, 
and selling medical coverage fit nicely with selling hospital in-
surance. Physicians had to realize, however, that “the solvency 
of this organization is in your hands” and that they were ulti-
mately the ones who would “sell” the insurance to the people in 
their communities.95  
Not surprisingly, once the floor at the delegates’ meeting 
was opened to general discussion, concerns surfaced. Who, ex-
actly, would control the new business: elected men? appointed 
men? representatives from each district? specialists? Were the 
delegates “being railroaded a little”? Dr. Dean Harman of Mills 
County finally spoke out about the basic injustice of the pro-
posed system: it limited coverage to physicians’ fees during 
hospitalization. He protested: 
Our hospital facilities are from twenty to thirty-five miles away. 
The adoption of this plan . . . would mean that the general practi-
tioners in Mills County would become nothing more than glori-
fied office boys. Must we take everybody to a hospital? Ninety per 
cent of our fractures are handled at home, 95 per cent of our ob-
stetric cases, and I will say 85 per cent of our medical cases. Given 
universal distribution of this plan, along with the Blue Cross, as 
soon as we make a diagnosis they will want to go to a hospital, 
naturally. That ends us. What do you want us to do? To sell ap-
ples on the street corner? . . . The fee bill takes care of the surgeon 
very well, but what does it do to the medical man?96
Several rural general practitioners agreed with Dr. Harman, but 
argued that they trusted the ISMS physicians who had put to-
gether the plan as a starting point for non-profit, physician-
controlled voluntary insurance in the state. As one delegate put 
it after listening to the debate, “I am going to depend upon the 
future to make [the plan] right with the physicians in the rural 
districts.” Other doctors basically admitted that they had to 
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trust the men who had examined the intricate details of the 
medical insurance business and so knew what would work and 
what would not.97
With final expressions of faith and optimism, the delegates 
finally passed the principles of the plan. Governor Robert Blue 
signed the enabling legislation on February 15, 1945, and the 
new non-profit corporation, the Iowa Medical Service, sold its 
first policies in September. By March 1946, the service’s board 
had dropped “the hospitalization clause . . . from surgery, ob-
stetrics and fracture work” to “benefit the small town doctor.” 
At first sales went reasonably well. In July 1946 Iowa Medical 
Service had 827 participating doctors—approximately one-third 
of the state’s licensed physicians—and 12,500 people enrolled. 
Because at least half of a county’s physicians had to be enrolled 
as providers before policies could be sold in it, however, cover-
age over the state varied considerably. In counties with a dozen 
physicians or less, it did not take many to prevent the plan’s 
expansion into certain areas, and growth soon slowed. Dr. Fred 
Sternagel, who chaired the ISMS’s Committee on Medical Ser-
vice, berated the state’s physicians in 1948: “Ominous signs of 
selfishness, suspicion and indifference among many of our mem-
bers threaten to ruin the whole program—selfishness and sus-
picion spawned in a period of materialistic ambitions and indif-
ference cradled by a false sense of security.” Similar messages 
came in the late 1940s from national leaders, who continued to 
link the possible failure of voluntary insurance with the inevita-
bility of a compulsory national health care system. “If the medi-
cal profession does not at once assume the leadership, if it does 
not at once cease its double talk and double dealing with the 
voluntary non-profit pre-payment plans, and throw its influ-
ence squarely and honestly behind these plans, we are going to 
have compulsory government health insurance in this country 
within three years,” Dr. Paul Hawley, chief executive officer of 
the newly organized Blue Cross–Blue Shield Commission, told 
readers of the ISMS Journal in August 1948.98
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The Iowa Medical Service joined the national Blue Shield 
group in 1946, as that organization sought to help physician-
controlled voluntary plans (whether for profit or non-profit at 
first) with information, coordination, and, eventually, ways to 
transfer payments among plans as subscriber contracts increas-
ingly crossed multiple plan areas.99 Perhaps the increasing na-
tional visibility and relative stability of Blue Shield corporations, 
along with the ongoing fear of “government” medicine, encour-
aged more Iowa doctors to participate in the plan. In early 1947, 
as well, the Iowa Medical Service became the contracting agent 
for the Veterans’ Administration’s “Home Town Medical Care 
Plan,” which allowed the 340,000 Iowa veterans to see their local 
physician for service-related conditions and pension authoriza-
tions instead of traveling to a VA clinic or hospital. Physicians 
who wanted to participate in the program had to register with 
the Iowa Medical Service.100 They did not have to belong to 
the ISMS plan itself to care for veterans, but filling out the pa-
perwork for one may have prompted doctors to send in their 
forms for the other. By April 1950, 78 percent of the physicians 
in practice in the state were Blue Shield providers, and the Iowa 
Medical Service—at least for the moment—was comfortably in 
the black. Only some 200,000 Iowans, or slightly less than 8 per-
cent of the state’s residents, were covered by the plan, how-
ever.101
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Blue Cross Blue Shield of Iowa took out this newspaper advertise-
ment to tout its success in securing members and to promote itself to 
potential new members. From Iowa City Press-Citizen, February 
19, 1950. 
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World War II: 
Military Service, the Home Front, and Postwar Iowa 
As hard as some of Iowa’s physicians worked to get non-profit, 
voluntary hospital and medical insurance plans off the ground 
between 1939 and 1947, such enterprises were certainly not 
the main focus of Iowans’ preoccupations during these years. 
Threats of war, war itself, and postwar adjustment reshaped 
many doctors’ lives. World War II had a much deeper effect on 
Iowa medicine than World War I had, largely due to the ways 
the Second World War intensified already ongoing changes in 
medical knowledge and practice. Not least of these changes was 
the expanding involvement of the federal government in scien-
tific research as well as health policy, the increasing status of 
board-certified medical specialists, and the stepped-up emphasis 
on the need to build more hospitals. The war also tested Iowa 
physicians’ voluntarism and sense of public duty in new ways, 
as military demand for doctors drained the state of young, able-
bodied male practitioners, nurses, and support staff. 
Official preparation for the medical needs of a military alert 
to war began in 1940, starting with the recall of medical reserve 
officers to active duty in the spring.102 In June the Surgeon Gen-
eral asked the AMA leadership to gather data on “the medical 
strength” of the country. The AMA created its Committee on 
Medical Preparedness and asked every state society to appoint 
a state chairman to organize local responses. Dr. Thomas Su-
chomel, a general practitioner in Cedar Rapids, took on this 
thankless task for Iowa, and he chaired the ISMS Medical Pre-
paredness Committee (later renamed the Procurement and As-
signment Service under the War Manpower Commission) until 
it formally dissolved on March 31, 1946.103  
Dr. Suchomel’s first job was to oversee the staffing of local 
draft boards with physicians who would examine recruits and 
report to the board on their physical and mental health. At a na-
tional conference on medical preparedness held in Chicago in 
                                                 
102. “Army Experience for Physicians,” JISMS 30 (1940), 169. 
103. Thomas F. Suchomel, “Report of the Committee on Medical Prepared-
ness,” JISMS 31 (1941), 326–29; Thomas F. Suchomel, “Report of State Chair-
man of Procurement and Assignment Service,” JISMS 36 (1946), 314–15. 
60      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
late September, “those present” decided that “examining physi-
cians should not be paid for their services but should make 
them their patriotic contribution to the government.” They 
would receive “some sort of badge and certificate” from the 
president of the United States to acknowledge their work, how-
ever. In addition, each county was to put together a Medical Ad-
visory Committee, consisting of various specialists, including a 
dentist and chiropodist, to assist examining physicians with con-
sultations. (The national leaders seemed to assume that every 
county actually had a slate of specialists.) Draftees passing this 
stage of induction were then seen by the Army Induction Board, 
where medical reserve officers and paid civilian consultants 
would make the final assessment of the young men’s suitability 
for military service.104
When the United States entered the war on December 8, 
1941, the draft went into high gear. All physicians were urged 
to register immediately with the AMA’s Procurement and As-
signment Service. If they did not, male doctors under the age of 
45 could be drafted for unclassified service and have a medical 
commission considerably delayed. All physicians, including 
women, the physically disabled, and those older than 45 had to 
register, moreover, so that state Procurement and Assignment 
Services could try to maintain an equitable distribution of doc-
tors. Physicians declared “essential to the proper medical care 
of the civilian population” would be deferred from service. 
Medical students, professors, and a limited number of residents 
were also placed on deferment, at least for the time being.105 
Medical schools went year round, and all eligible students were 
required to take military commissions, which, after a nine-month 
internship, would place them in active service unless they quali-
fied for one of the limited number of residencies deemed vital 
for the war effort. The Selective Service also had a direct say in 
the entry of new students into medical schools as the war con-
tinued. Despite the obvious need for new practitioners, the 
number of women students at the UI medical school remained 
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at its prewar level of four to five percent.106 The relatively small 
number of women (and of men ineligible for military service) 
who managed to graduate between 1942 and 1945 simply could 
not fill the demand for interns or community practitioners left 
in the wake of war. 
Throughout the war, the War Manpower Commission relied 
on the medical profession to recruit its own members for military 
needs, rather than resort to forced induction of doctors, although 
it did establish state quotas.107 Such privileges placed consider-
able burdens on state chairmen after the first rush of patriotic 
fervor brought out the volunteers. Iowa proudly came through 
with 122 percent of its quota for 1942—unlike New York, Con-
necticut, and Massachusetts, which had not met even 90 percent 
of their 1942 quotas by May 1943. Physicians even came out of 
retirement to lend a hand. Dr. William A. Howard, for example, 
“formerly retired and living near Cherokee, has located in Truro, 
where he . . . will occupy the offices of Dr. Herbert N. Boden who 
has entered the military service.” By the spring of 1943, however, 
Dr. Suchomel had started to feel the pinch as voluntarism fal-
tered. Physicians who could not meet the physical requirements 
for military service, for instance, could be classified as able to be 
relocated in order to release a young, willing doctor who had 
been considered “essential” in his community. Suchomel openly 
expressed his frustration with three doctors “who have flatly 
refused to cooperate” with requests to relocate, and wished he 
had the authority to force them to submit.108  
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The physicians who did stay in Iowa certainly found their 
responsibilities increasing. In addition to the extra patient loads 
and indigent work they shouldered, many physicians were 
urged to participate in community service activities that had 
started before the war and continued during these difficult years. 
County medical societies trying to foster good relationships 
with the State Board of Health and various lay organizations 
wanted to maintain their cooperative programs, including an-
nual drives to vaccinate infants and young children against 
smallpox and diphtheria, tuberculosis screening clinics, and 
health projects for 4-H groups. When fuel and food rationing 
started, physicians found that they were responsible for filling 
out forms to attest that the sick and vulnerable needed extra sup-
plies. Some of the doctors who had started to specialize had to 
devote more time to general practice, while those near hospitals 
that had come to rely on full complements of interns and resi-
dents for night duties had to take turns staying in the hospitals 
as the War Manpower Commission siphoned off interns and 
residents for military work. At the annual ISMS meetings in 1943 
and 1944, district councilors reported on the stresses facing the 
“older doctors,” who were “giving of their time and strength 
almost to the breaking point.” The councilors assured each 
other that no one “was suffering from want of adequate medi-
cal care,” yet when Des Moines County had “only 23 doctors 
to look after the needs of about 50,000 persons,” some of those 
needs must have gone unnoticed.109
Wartime conditions at home also inspired new language 
about the value of the physician’s time. A 1942 editorial in the 
ISMS Journal declared that medical service had already become  
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The pharmaceutical company Wyeth took out advertisements to advise the 
public, because of the shortage of physicians caused by the war, to be con-
scious of saving their doctor’s time, in part by going to the doctor, not 
relying on the doctor to make house calls. From Journal of the Iowa 
State Medical Society 35 (March 1945), xxvii. 
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as “sharply rationed,” even if not officially, as fuel and food 
were. “John Q. Public” had to refrain from calling at night, ex-
cept for truly urgent conditions. People had to sacrifice “their 
convenience to the convenience of the doctor instead of vice 
versa,” and try to see their physicians during office hours.110 
Paul V. McNutt, who chaired the War Manpower Commission, 
was even more adamant about making medical practice efficient. 
He told the audience at the American Hospital Association War 
Conference in the fall of 1942 that “everything possible must be 
done to make the time of these [civilian] physicians count for 
the maximum of service to patients.” “Every half hour of pro-
fessional service,” he continued, “must now do an hour’s work.” 
To compress an hour into 30 minutes, routine tasks had to be 
delegated to nurses and assistants; hospitals had to expand out-
patient clinics, so that physicians could reduce home visiting. 
At the same time, hospitals and physicians themselves had 
to adapt to shortages in equipment and supplies. “You have to 
face the paradox of producing more and more service with 
less and less equipment. You have to make old equipment do,” 
McNutt stated flatly.111
Civilians, including physicians, demonstrated their patriot-
ism by facing long hours of work and limited resources with 
cheerfulness, or at least not too much overt grumbling. But a 
number of Iowa physicians found their patriotic sensibilities 
stretched to the limit when Congress passed an act in March 
1943 to establish the Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Pro-
gram (EMIC) for the wives and infants of enlisted men in grades 
four through seven of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and 
Coast Guard. The act allocated $4.4 million for the Children’s 
Bureau (under the Department of Labor) to distribute in fiscal 
year 1943–44 to states that accepted its provisions. Adminis-
tered through states’ departments of health, the program cov-
ered all wives and infants of low-ranking servicemen through 
pregnancy, childbirth, six weeks of maternal postnatal care, and 
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the first year of the child’s life.112 There was to be no means test; 
this was not charity. The Children’s Bureau determined a na-
tionwide fee schedule for doctors’ services and hospital charges. 
To participate in the service, women had to accept “ward ser-
vice” for themselves and their infants, and doctors had to agree 
that “supplementary payment from the family must not be ac-
cepted,” even if patients were “able and willing to pay” the dif-
ference between the specified maximum fees and the doctors’ 
normal charges. Payments for care were sent directly to the 
physician, moreover, which brought the dreaded “third party 
[that is, the government] between the physician and his patient.” 
In April 1943 the ISMS Maternal and Child Health Committee 
advised “that there was no alternative but to cooperate in the 
program,” as the federal government had already widely publi-
cized it. By December, after the program had started in Iowa and 
the Children’s Bureau had refused to make changes that “prac-
ticing physicians” had pleaded for, the ISMS Maternal and 
Child Health Committee made it clear that “continued coopera-
tion is based solely upon patriotic grounds and a desire on the 
part of the medical profession to take no action which would in 
any way impede the war effort.”113  
Physicians did not have to participate in the program. “But 
few physicians wish to be placed in the embarrassing position 
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of refusing their services to the wives and infants of our coun-
trymen,” an editorial in the ISMS Journal pointed out. Embar-
rassed or not, Dr. Arthur D. Woods, a physician from Marshall 
County, reported to the 1944 ISMS annual meeting that mem-
bers of his county society had “unanimously rejected the plan. 
. . . We are taking care of the women, and, if we have to, we will 
do it for nothing.” “This is an extremely hot baby,” Dr. Lee Roy 
Woodward of Mason City—and ISMS president that year—re-
marked as a lively discussion opened among the members of 
the society’s House of Delegates. Enlisted men’s wives and in-
fants needed medical care, and no one disputed the worthy 
intent of the plan. And, Dr. Suchomel reminded his colleagues, 
if ISMS physicians refused to participate, osteopathic physicians 
would have a “golden opportunity of publicizing the fact” and 
would be more than happy to take on these patients. Dr. C. P. 
McHugh warned his fellow delegates that they would only 
alienate soldiers and sailors. “When a fellow comes out from 
some jungle in which he has been for weeks and weeks and 
says, ‘Some doctor wouldn’t take care of my wife in Marshall-
town because they would only give him $35.00,’ he is going to 
be mad, and every man in his company is going to be mad.” In 
the end, the delegates passed a resolution protesting the Chil-
dren’s Bureau’s “regimentation” of medical care, and decided 
to send two representatives to Washington, D.C., to register 
their complaints with Iowa congressmen and to testify before 
an upcoming House Appropriations Committee hearing.114  
Dr. Everett Plass, a nationally known professor of obstetrics 
and gynecology at the UI College of Medicine, and Dr. Ransom 
Bernard of Clarion, a general practitioner with a specialty inter-
est in surgery, went to Washington for the April 27 appropria-
tions hearing. Nothing changed. Congress approved a $42.8 
million appropriation to EMIC for 1944–45 and refused to con-
sider a different payment method. “The government’s position 
seemed to be that it was acting in favor of the doctors, because 
if the subsidy were to be paid directly to the serviceman’s wife 
she might spend it for something else and the physician would 
not get paid at all.” The Children’s Bureau adamantly upheld 
                                                 
114. “Transactions of the House of Delegates,” JISMS 34 (1944), 307–11, 316–18. 
Iowa Physicians      67 
its payment system, moreover, because it did not want any ser-
viceman’s wife to have “to bargain with either the hospital or 
the physician over the fee she was to pay. This it was claimed 
would defeat the whole purpose of the program, which is to 
provide obstetric and infant care absolutely free.”115  
In an essay published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association early in 1945, Dr. Plass zeroed in on what he saw as 
the “fundamental issues” at stake in the EMIC program. These 
were not just the problems that physicians had already raised, 
which he reiterated, but encroachment of the federal govern-
ment directly into providing medical care. “It cannot be denied 
that sentiment for compulsory federalized health insurance is 
strong among our legislators.” The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, 
first introduced in 1943, which promised a sweeping national 
health system, was about to be brought before Congress again. 
The EMIC, Dr. Plass and others observed, pointed to how such 
a system might actually operate—its expense, the “vast amount 
of clerical and bookkeeping work,” and the “onerous form of 
regimentation” that came with imposing a “countrywide finan-
cial standard” on both physicians and patients.116  
For Dr. Plass, the EMIC plan had also highlighted “the split 
personality of the medical profession.” Many physicians did 
want to make money, sometimes at the expense of their ideals. 
“The same monetary urge has made the physician oppose the 
EMIC program violently in his society meetings, even while he 
is accepting as many patients as come to him for care under its 
provision,” Dr. Plass wrote. When the Children’s Bureau raised 
the maximum fee for “complete obstetric care” from $35 to $50, 
it knew what it was doing, Dr. Plass argued. Making “minor 
financial concessions to pacify the majority of medical men” 
diffused the political will of organized medicine.  
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As critical as he was of EMIC, Dr. Plass recognized that sim-
ply complaining would not accomplish much. “Without offering 
another plan which will resolve the admitted inequalities of the 
present system of medical practice, we brand ourselves as non-
progressive reactionaries and still further lower ourselves in the 
eyes of the public.”117 He offered no suggestions at that point, 
but opinions like Dr. Plass’s undoubtedly fueled the push for 
physician-controlled voluntary insurance plans under way in 
Iowa and elsewhere as the war drew to a close. Certainly the 
Children’s Bureau’s efforts to continue funding maternity and 
infant medical care after the “emergency” of war had passed 
faced physicians’ “resentment and antagonism” at having had 
their viewpoints ignored. Even the Executive Board of the Amer-
ican Academy of Pediatrics, long a staunch supporter of Chil-
dren’s Bureau’s programs, had decided in 1944 to “publicly an-
nounce withdrawal” of their support for the Bureau after the 
war ended, given the evidence that the Bureau planned to “di-
rectly invade the field of private practice of medicine.”118
The defeat of bills for a comprehensive national health sys-
tem during the war and in the immediate postwar period rested 
on a great deal more than physicians’ irritation with the heavy-
handedness of the Children’s Bureau, of course. The reactions 
of Iowa’s doctors—both academic specialists such as Dr. Plass 
and small-town general practitioners such as Dr. Woods—
nevertheless reveal another layer of doctors’ frustration with 
“government” medicine, and so help to convey why many of 
them opposed it so staunchly despite their concerns about real 
inequities in American health care.  
Federal involvement with medical institutions and practice 
continued to expand after the war, however. Elements of the 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell vision that appeared in separate bills 
passed Congress between 1945 and 1950, largely because they 
had the support of organized medicine. The Hill-Burton Act of 
1946 (the Hospital Survey and Construction Act), for example, 
                                                 
117. Plass, “The Physician’s Attitude Toward EMIC,” 105. 
118. “The EMIC Program and the Children’s Bureau,” JISMS 34 (1944), 405–6; 
“Next Steps Proposed for the Children’s Bureau by the National Commission 
on Children in Wartime,” JISMS 35 (1945), 332–33; “Defeat or Modification of 
S. 1318 Imperative,” JISMS 35 (1945), 439. 
Iowa Physicians      69 
provided funds for determining areas where hospitals were 
most needed, and grants-in-aid to states for one-third of the 
cost of constructing facilities in high-priority areas. By February 
1950, 31 plans for new or expanded hospitals in Iowa were un-
der way, at a cost of nearly $19 million.119 The importance of 
tax-funded investment in medical research, which had gained 
new urgency at the federal level during the war, transformed 
the National Institutes of Health under generous appropria-
tions from Congress; in 1947, the NIH received $4 million for 
in-house and extramural research, compared with $180,000 in 
1945. Other agencies, such as the U.S. Public Health Service and 
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, also had increased budgets 
for funding medical research at universities, including the Uni-
versity of Iowa. The GI Bill, which applied to returning military 
physicians seeking additional training, along with determined 
AMA efforts to orchestrate enough residencies to fill their de-
mands, turned political thoughts to devising a federal grant pro-
gram to support medical education, resulting in much-debated 
bills introduced in Congress in 1949 and 1950.120
The war and the political fervor for a national health care 
system also pushed practitioners towards specialization. Dr. 
George Wilkinson, who received his University of Iowa M.D. in 
1941, reminded his audience at the ISMS meeting in 1948 of the 
military facts of life. “In the army it became evident that special-
ized training was of paramount importance. Formalized resi-
dency training and board certification were the primary decid-
ing factors which obtained the pleasant and interesting hospital  
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R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company took out a full-page advertisement in the 
Journal of the Iowa State Medical Society to thank doctors for their 
service during the war and to welcome them home. From Journal of the 
Iowa State Medical Society 35 (December 1945), xix. 
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assignments.” After the war, he returned to do a surgical resi-
dency: “it was distasteful that I should relegate myself to the 
roll [sic] of pimping for the specialist.” Dr. Wilkinson noted that 
he particularly feared “the limitations and restrictions which 
board men, certified specialists, and medical politicians would 
attempt to clamp on me” if he did not follow the prescribed 
path. He ultimately decided, nevertheless, that he really wanted 
a general practice, and left the residency to open an office in 
Burlington. Some physicians leaving service assumed that if 
“socialized medicine” came to the United States they would be 
classified as they had been in the military, with salaries linked 
to specialty experience and certification, “and many of them re-
solved to secure these advantages when they returned home.”121  
The attraction of specialty practice for veterans and new 
graduates sparked concern over the probable demise of the gen-
eral practitioner, which joined the dismay of earlier decades over 
the apparent passing of the rural doctor. In 1949 Dr. Michael 
Carey, a middle-aged general practitioner in Council Bluffs, 
wrote bluntly that “today, to be a general practitioner seems to 
carry a stigma of inferiority.” He urged his colleagues to sup-
port efforts to heighten professional respect for their work be-
cause, he asserted, patients preferred general practitioners, who 
were “willing to listen to their ailments . . . and treat their bodies 
as a whole, not piecemeal,” rather than “be bandied about from 
one specialist to another.” For Dr. Carey, specialists threatened 
not only “the intimate doctor-patient relationship, so necessary 
to private practice,” but also general practitioners’ autonomy. 
Ever increasing restrictions on what the general practitioner 
could do in the hospital—being told one day, for example, that 
“such-and-such procedures may be done only by a certified 
specialist” after having done them for years—pointed to a fu-
ture that Dr. Carey did not welcome. The “rules and regulations 
fostered and inspired by apparently well-meaning [national] 
board members” heralded the way that the medical profession 
itself was moving toward setting national standards for practice 
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in the postwar decades.122 The diverging paths of generalists 
and specialists, heightened by the expanding role that medical 
research had within medical schools and university hospitals, 
came into focus in these postwar years, and they would reshape 
the meaning of “physician control” for the rest of the century. 
 
Conclusion 
“Physician control,” the mantra so regularly voiced during 
meetings of the Iowa State Medical Society and published in the 
Journal’s editorials and articles, spurred the expansion of organ-
ized medicine between 1929 and 1950. It provided a common 
ground for resistance to outside groups—especially govern-
ment agencies—that hoped to control private, fee-for-service 
medical practice or, more radically, to replace it with some 
other system that could bring affordable health care to all 
Americans. As much as some Iowa physicians may have dis-
liked the American Medical Association, when it came to deal-
ing with perceived threats to their professional autonomy, the 
county medical society became the local unit for professional 
solidarity, and the state medical society the place to work for 
political goals. 
The experiences and reactions of Iowa physicians in the 
1930s thus highlight not only the increasing pressures on them 
to find some solutions for the burdens of high medical costs, but 
also the complexities of their responses to those demands when 
faced with the changes that pre-payment plans might make to 
the way they practiced medicine. As important as considera-
tions of income clearly were for AMA leaders and rural physi-
cians alike, Iowa physicians at all levels saw state and federal 
involvement in payment programs as threatening several pro-
foundly held values that meant as much as—or more than—
money. A decade of experience with trying to care for indigent 
patients during the Depression deeply undermined the physi-
cian’s traditional methods of managing poverty: the sliding 
scale, personal charity, and a firm belief that the poor should 
have free choice of physician, who would then provide the best 
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medical treatment without regard for remuneration. As un-
pleasant as the individual physician’s paternalism may have 
been for patients unable to pay, or as deficient as that care may 
actually have been for those stigmatized by pauperism, practi-
tioners took considerable pride in their idealistic values in the 
midst of their own economic distress. As long as physicians felt 
that their generosity was largely voluntary and appreciated, 
then they could be proud of it. When it was expected and im-
posed by lay people, whether businessmen or social workers, 
they felt undermined, exploited, and dependent on others’ es-
timation of the value of their work. 
During the 1930s Iowa physicians of all sorts gained direct 
experience with “government” medicine when managing care 
for the indigent and poor in their counties. Where county medi-
cal societies negotiated with boards of supervisors for care of 
the indigent, moreover, Iowa physicians had to balance their 
individual autonomy with the collective good of the physicians 
who shared that duty. However much physicians may have 
talked about collective interests and proclaimed professional 
ideals in their meetings, the abstract became quite concrete at 
that point. The work had to be done and fair bills submitted, 
sometimes even reviewed by their own colleagues. The county 
supervisors and relief agents in charge of state and federal allo-
cations scrutinized hospital costs and physicians’ charges as 
well, and brought external monitoring of medical costs to a new 
bureaucratic level.  
In the 1940s the Emergency Maternity and Infant Care pro-
gram provided another experience of “government” medicine. 
The purpose was admirable, for doctors had long advocated the 
importance of prenatal and infant care for reducing maternal 
and infant morbidity and mortality. In its execution, however, 
physicians felt manipulated into accepting a nationally stan-
dardized program in which their points of view were trivialized 
and ignored. That experience made even the most patriotic of 
Iowa doctors bitter.  
Physicians’ reluctant turn toward voluntary, non-profit hos-
pital and medical insurance in Iowa was born of political neces-
sity. The Iowa Hospital Association (Blue Cross) and Iowa Med-
ical Service (Blue Shield) plans were “physician controlled” in 
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the sense that leaders of the ISMS appointed physicians to the 
boards of these non-profit corporations, and those physicians 
had some influence on the plans’ scope and principles. Profes-
sional managers and insurance experts also had a great deal of 
weight in how these businesses operated, however. In 1948–49, 
when hospital costs under Blue Cross in Iowa had risen faster 
than its managers expected, analysis pointed to “possible abuse” 
in admission for diagnostic purposes and in the ordering of ex-
pensive laboratory services, drugs, oxygen, and physical therapy. 
“It is felt that the physician must have the moral fortitude to tell 
his patient he is not entitled to diagnostic services under his con-
tract,” an editorial in the ISMS Journal told its readers. And, it 
went on, doctors simply had to keep costs down or voluntary 
insurance plans—their plans—would fail.123  
In the midst of confusion and frustration over professional 
issues, physicians did have a major solace in the late 1940s. What 
they could do for their patients expanded every year. Antibiotics 
cured people rapidly sinking towards death. Prompt whole 
blood transfusions enabled others to survive trauma and opera-
tions that would have been nearly impossible before. Soon, other 
new drugs and techniques were announced so frequently that 
rapid change itself became the new status quo. As federal funds 
began to flow to Iowa for advanced laboratory and clinical in-
vestigations, moreover, Iowa-based physicians and scientists be-
gan to make their marks in national and international circles for 
their research results. Over the next 50 years, heartfelt celebra-
tions of biomedicine’s efficacy and triumphs regularly appeared 
alongside continuing criticisms of the profession’s inability to fig-
ure out how to bring affordable, high-quality, empathetic health 
care to all people. Iowans, like many Americans, had learned to 
want it all. 
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